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The decisions of the United States Supreme Court have far-reaching implications 
in American life. Using transcripts of Supreme Court oral arguments this work looks at 
the conversational dynamics of Supreme Court justices and links their conversational 
interaction with the decisions of the Court and individual justices. While several studies 
have looked at the relationship between oral arguments and case variables, to our 
knowledge, none have looked at the relationship between conversational dynamics and 
case outcomes. Working from this view, we show that the conversation of Supreme Court 
justices is both predictable and predictive. We aim to show that conversation during 
Supreme Court cases is patterned, this patterned conversation is associated with case 
outcomes, and that this association can be used to make predictions about case outcomes.  
We present three sets of experiments to accomplish this. The first examines the 
order of speakers during oral arguments as a patterned sequence, showing that cohesive 
elements in the discourse, along with references to individuals, provide significant 
improvements over our “bag-of-words” baseline in identifying speakers in sequence 
 
within a transcript. The second graphically examines the association between speaker 
turn-taking and case outcomes. The results presented with this experiment point to 
interesting and complex relationships between conversational interaction and case 
variables, such as justices’ votes. The third experiment shows that this relationship can be 
used in the prediction of case outcomes with accuracy ranging from 62.5% to 76.8% for 
varying conditions. Finally, we offer recommendations for improved tools for legal 
researchers interested in the relationship between conversation during oral arguments and 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
 
The United States Supreme Court plays a significant role in the U.S. Government; 
the decisions reached by Supreme Court justices have far-reaching implications for the 
entire American legal system.  In this work, we aim to combine conversation analysis 
with computational techniques in novel approaches for the analysis of the behavior of the 
U.S. Supreme Court, in terms of both the justices individually and the Court as a whole.    
Considerable amounts of work have been done applying computational 
techniques to the political domain. For example, Mosteller and Wallace (1964) utilized 
models based on function word counts to identify the authorship of The Federalist 
Papers. Laver et al. (2003) used party manifestos and legislative speeches to identify the 
ideological positions of political parties in Britain, Ireland and Germany. More directly 
related to this work is that of Thomas et al. (2006), who examined the content of 
congressional floor debates and the relationships between congresspersons to determine 
whether individuals were in support of or opposition to the legislation under discussion. 
Also, Evans et al. (2007) classified the ideological position of third-party briefs from the 
briefs’ content. We leave further discussion of related work to Chapter 2. 
This thesis explores justice turn-taking during United States Supreme Court oral 
arguments and its relationship to other aspects of justice behavior. For our purposes, we 
will treat each speech segment in the argument transcripts with a single speaker identifier 
as one turn.1 Thus, the oral arguments are organized into a series of turns produced by the 
                                                
1 Due to the Courtroom reporter’s handling of factors such as interruption and overlapping speech, this 
definition of turn is somewhat different from that used in conversation analysis, where they are “turns at 
talk” composed of units that are grammatically and phonetically realized and “constitute a recognizable 
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justices and the attorneys before the Court. The first experiments we discuss look at the 
prediction of the turn-taking behavior of justices by exploring the task of labeling turns 
with their speakers when this information is unavailable in an oral arguments transcript. 
The next Chapter is a broad-scale analysis of the turn-taking patterns of justices in 
various conditions by looking at patterns of when justices typically follow-up on other 
justices’ lines of questioning. Chapter 5 discusses a group of experiments that looks at the 
turn-taking behavior of justices as a predictor of case outcomes.  
This work will be immediately relevant to researchers exploring the behavior of 
the United States Supreme Court. This view of the conversational dynamics between the 
justices as both predictable and predictive is one that has received little attention in the 
literature. By applying computational models to this approach, this work will provide 
new tools that may be able to open up novel avenues of research for legal scholars. 
Moreover, this work should also have broader implications. While we have concentrated 
on applying existing computational tools to a new approach to understanding the 
Supreme Court, the methods we develop here will be applicable to similar settings where 
one may wish to link conversational actions to other actions with a real world impact. If 
this is the case, then these methods will help to provide a deeper understanding of other 
social institutions and human conversational interaction in general.  
While the narrow focus of this work is to produce methods for classification and 
labeling of the oral arguments of the U.S. Supreme Court, this research was conducted 
with the broader goal of creating novel approaches for judicial scholars to use in 
examining the dynamics of the Supreme Court. 
                                                                                                                                            
action in context” (Schegloff 2007; 3-4). Despite this difference, there will still be significant overlap 
between what we are defining as a turn and what a conversation analyst would define as a turn.  
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Our primary objective is to gain a clearer understanding of the role of the 
conversational dynamics of Supreme Court justices. We aim to show that: a) predictable 
high level patterns exist in the conversational dynamics of the Supreme Court, b) these 
patterns may be associated with other areas of interest to legal scholars such as voting 
patterns of the justices, c) this association between linguistic patterns and judicial patterns 
may be utilized to provide both short term insights (i.e. predicting the outcome of a 
particular case) and deeper insights about the behavior of the Supreme Court.  
In the process of pursuing these objectives we have decided to minimize the need 
for specialized knowledge and training for feature identification. In order to do this, we 
minimize theoretical commitments, thus reducing the need for an extensive background 
in any particular theory of discourse. Moreover, we want to reduce reliance on features 
that can only be encoded with human judgment and expertise, by favoring features that 
can be automatically recognized. By restricting ourselves to such conditions we hope to 
maximize the applicability and reproducibility of our methods, as the reliance on human 
judgment has hampered both of these qualities in some previous work. Despite this, we 
expect that higher level information from more sophisticated approaches, such as 
sentiment analysis, would only add to the value and power of these basic approaches. 
Producing any positive result for this work is a contribution to the overall 
understanding of the Court. While small studies using human judgments have produced 
relatively large positive results, larger studies using automatic methods still achieve 
relatively small improvements (See Section 2.4). In one case, these automatic methods 
achieve comparable results to our own work with an order of magnitude more data. Also, 
when tested on our dataset, these methods achieve considerably lower results. Just as 
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these larger studies have contributed to the understanding of the relationship between one 
aspect of oral arguments and case outcomes, positive results in this work should 
contribute to the understanding of the relationship between conversational interaction and 
case outcomes.  Moreover, given the relative simplicity of our feature sets, the fact that 
we are able to gain some predictive power at all from these features may be a surprising 
result for legal scholars (Evans, M. personal correspondence, August 28, 2009).  
Thesis Organization 
  The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows:  
• Chapter 2 discusses background on oral arguments, discourse and 
conversation analysis, computational approaches to discourse and 
conversation analysis, quantitative research on oral arguments, and the 
Supreme Court case database used in two of our experiments.  
• Chapter 3, Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 cover our three experiment groups 
dealing with turn sequence labeling, “rose diagrams” of turn-taking and 
case outcomes and case outcome prediction, respectively.   
• The final Chapter offers conclusions from this work and suggests some 
future research and unanswered questions. 
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Chapter 2 Background 
 
This chapter contains three main parts. The first part covers the domain 
knowledge regarding the area of study contained in this thesis, namely, oral arguments 
and the Supreme Court. The second introduces the linguistic area of study we utilize in 
this thesis, specifically, conversation and discourse analysis. The third part is an overview 
of computational studies in discourse analysis as well as a review of both computational 
and manual studies of the Supreme Court. We include one final section to introduce our 
source of Supreme Court case data (not including oral argument transcripts).  
2.1 Oral Arguments/Supreme Court 
 As one of the last, and only public, stages a case goes through before the Supreme 
Court, the importance of oral arguments is often questioned. At this stage, all briefs have 
been submitted by each side of a case and by amici curiae, and the justices have had time 
to study the details of the case. It is believed that by this time, justices have had sufficient 
opportunity to make up their mind regarding a case, and so it is often suggested oral 
arguments play little if any role in justices’ decision making process (Rhode & Spaeth 
1976; Kurland & Hutchinson 1983; Segal & Spaeth 2002). Kurland and Hutchinson 
(1983) argue, “There are a few cases in which oral argument serves as a means of 
discovery by the Justices. But there is no reason why this discovery could not be 
conducted better by interrogatories than by oral deposition.” This view is not just held by 
academics either: some justices have also expressed these views. Justice Thomas once 
said, “99 per cent of the time justices have made up their mind when they go to the 
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bench. Also, there are so many questions you have to elbow your way in” (Rombeck 
2002; 5B).  
Even for those justices who do view oral arguments as important, it would seem 
that they do not believe oral augments typically lead a justice to change his or her mind. 
On the topic of whether oral argument matters, Justice Rehnquist wrote, “I think it does 
make a difference” though only in “a significant minority of cases….The change is 
seldom a full one-hundred-and-eighty-degree swing, and I find that it is most likely to 
occur in cases involving areas of law with which I am least familiar” (Rehnquist 2002).  
In a 2009 interview, Justice Scalia (who admits that he once believed oral arguments 
were a “dog and pony show” (Johnson 2004)) said, “A lot of people are under the 
impression that [oral advocacy] is a dog and pony show. The judges have read the briefs, 
they come in with their minds made up, and this is just a performance for the benefit of 
your client. If that’s the impression you have, you are just wrong. I have never met a 
judge who doesn’t think that oral argument is important” (Duke Law 2009). However, 
similar to Rehnquist, he suggested that only in cases where he has not already made up 
his mind do oral arguments play a role in his decision making.  
While the view that oral arguments are unimportant is commonly held, some 
scholars have also argued against it, suggesting that justices do in fact utilize information 
gained during oral arguments to make decisions (Johnson 2001, Johnson 2004, Shullman 
2004, Johnson et al. 2006). Johnson (2001; 2)  points out that up to oral arguments, the 
majority of information the justices have seen is that which “other actors want them to 
see and consider”, and that justices use oral arguments as an opportunity to get at what 
they want to “see and consider” in order to make a decision in the case. However, even in 
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these studies, the strongest conclusion made is that, in typical cases, oral arguments at 
best are used to refine a justices’ opinion, thus having an important impact on the details 
of a case’s outcome but not necessarily on the case’s overall outcome.  
 Johnston et al. (2009a) note David Frederick’s observation that oral arguments are 
composed of conversations between a lawyer, a justice and another “potentially 
persuadable justice”. While the above description of oral arguments should indicate that 
the existence of “potentially persuadable justices” may be in question, it seems natural to 
presume that even if justices cannot be persuaded during oral arguments, other justices 
will still attempt to do so.  
2.2 Discourse Analysis 
Discourse analysis is a fairly broad subfield of linguistics.  Schiffrin et al. (2001; 
1) note that discourse analysis is often not strictly defined but usually refers to one of 
three domains of study; “(1) anything beyond the sentence, (2) language use, and (3) a 
broader range of social practice that includes nonlinguistic and nonspecific instances of 
language.” Given this broad definition of discourse analysis, it is clear that there is an 
open view of what exactly is meant by “discourse”. Typically, however, the term is used 
to indicate a language-based communication forming a “unified whole” (referred to as a 
text in the discourse analysis literature), and such communications can take on a variety 
of forms including written, spoken or signed (Halliday and Hasan 1976, Johnstone 2007). 
With regard to the domains of study discourse analysis may involve, aspects of this work 
could fall under each of these categories; while our first experiment looks at (potentially) 
extra-sentential linguistic units, overall this work is looking at language use in a 
particular social setting, the Supreme Court, and the relationship between that language 
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use and the overall behavior of the Supreme Court. As for our particular version of 
discourse, we are dealing with transcribed spontaneous speech which inherently 
incorporates both written and spoken language.  
Regardless of the form of communication under consideration, three of the key 
aspects of discourse an analyst is often concerned with are texture, cohesion, and 
coherence. Texture, the defining characteristic of a text, is identified by Halliday and 
Hasan (1976; 2) as “the property of being a text…this [texture] is what distinguishes it [a 
text] from something that is not a text”. Take (1) for example. 
(1)   A: Does the store carry galvanized wire? 
  B: Yeah, they do.  
 
This simple exchange can be said to have texture, because it can stand alone as (or at 
least be a part of) a unified conversation.  
Contributing to the texture of (1) is the use of reference (anaphora; they refers to 
the store) and substitution (do stands in for carry galvanized wire) in B. Taken together, 
these lend cohesion to the text, creating texture.  Cohesion refers to the relations that exist 
within a text between separate units in that text and the idea that “the INTERPRETATION of 
some element in the discourse is dependent on that of another” (Halliday and Hasan 
1976; 4). In the example above, in order to interpret B correctly we need A.  Cohesion 
can take on a number of forms, falling under the headings of grammatical cohesion and 
lexical cohesion. Grammatical cohesion refers to the use of grammatical tools to create 
cohesive relations in a text; including reference and substitution as in the example above 
as well as ellipsis (omission of clauses; e.g. Who stole the book? – John stole the book) 
and conjunction (linking of clauses; e.g. John went to the bank. Later he went to the 
 9 
movies).2 We will discuss conjunction more thoroughly later in this Section. Lexical 
cohesion includes repetition of the same word, or semantically related words such as 
holonyms (tree-forest), hypernyms (hat-clothing), semantically “close” terms (banana-
apple), etc. (Halliday and Hasan 1976, Brown and Yule 1983).  
While cohesion deals with overt relations in a text, coherence deals with relations 
that must be interpreted by an individual listening to or reading a text. Coherent relations 
are the underlying relations that hold between segments of text (Brown and Yule 1983). 
Returning to (1) above, while B is a cohesive response to A, we need to appeal to 
coherence in order to describe it as an appropriate response to A, as cohesion is no 
guarantee of coherence. For example, suppose we changed B in (1) as we have done in 
(2). While B is cohesive with A in (2), they still refers to the store, it is no longer a 
coherent answer to A.  
(2)  A: Does the store carry galvanized wire? 
B: They are open on Sundays.  
 
Thus, coherence too is a necessary aspect in building an interpretable discourse. For this 
work, we make the assumption that the texts we are dealing with, as spontaneous 
conversations between multiple individuals, are in fact coherent discourses at least for the 
parties involved. And, while it is not necessarily the case across all sorts of text and all 
relations within a text, we are making the assumption that the majority of cohesive 
relations existing in the text are representative of underlying coherent relations.   
 The connection between conjunction and the coherence relations they signal plays 
a role in Chapter 3. While the collection of potential conjunctive elements in English is 
extensive, Brown and Yule (1983) offer several examples as summarized in Table 1. 
                                                
2 Note that the usage of some terms, such as anaphora and ellipsis, is somewhat different in discourse 
analysis than in generative linguistics.  
 10 
   
Type Examples 
Additive and, or, furthermore, similarly, in addition,  
Adversative but, however, on the other hand, nevertheless 
Causal so, consequently, for this reason, it follows from this  
Temporal then, after that, an hour later, finally, at last 
Table 1 Example conjunctive relation markers (Brown and Yule 1983; 191). 
 
It is important to note that because of the role of cohesion in the interpretation of 
discourse, these elements do not always identify the relations they are paired with in 
Table 1, nor are explicit elements required to mark these sorts of relations (Brown and 
Yule 1983). Nevertheless, overt markers of such relations are abundant in many forms of 
discourse, and do tend to exhibit some regularity in the relations they identify (as 
indicated by Table 1), even if the relationship is at times variable.  
2.3 Conversation Analysis 
Because this work deals with transcripts of oral arguments, it is most closely 
related to conversation analysis which may be viewed as a branch of discourse analysis.3  
Hutchby and Wooffitt (2008; 13) write the “aim” of conversation analysis (CA in their 
terms) “is to focus on the production and interpretation of talk-in-interaction as an orderly 
accomplishment that is oriented by the participants themselves…. CA seeks to uncover 
the organization of talk…from the perspective of how the participants display for one 
another their understanding of ‘what is going on’”. Because of this view, there is a focus 
on conversation as a sequence of “turns at talk”, with each subsequent speaker turn in a 
conversation indicating the speaker’s understanding of the preceding conversation 
                                                
3 However, conversation analysis comes with its own tools, methods and procedures for recording and 
analyzing conversation that we do not make use of. Despite this, many of the topics of interest to the 
conversation analyst are relevant to this discussion.  
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(Hutchby and Wooffitt 2008).  In the present work we are particularly interested in this 
sequence of turns, how predictable that sequence is in a setting like the Supreme Court, 
and the relationship between this sequence and other actions taken by the Court.  
The previous discussion of cohesion and coherence can be tied into conversation 
analysis through a particular aspect of conversational sequence organization known as 
adjacency pairs. Adjacency pairs include two turns that are usually, but not necessarily, 
adjacent in conversation, where the first turn “initiates some exchange” and the second 
turn is “responsive” to the first. These are treated as pairs because not all types of 
initiations can be followed by all sorts of responses. So while Question/Answer (e.g. (1)) 
and Apology/Acceptance (e.g. (3)) are typical adjacency pairs, Question/Acceptance and 
Apology/Answer are not (Schegloff 2007; 13-14).  
(3) A: Sorry I broke your mug. 
B: That’s ok. 
 
Regardless of the pair, recognizing a pair as a member of a particular type requires a 
coherent interpretation of that pair. However, responses to the first part of a pair may 
include or be entirely composed of elements that are cohesive with the previous turn (4). 
(4)  A: When are we going to the movies? 
  B: Later.  
 
Often times, as in the example given, these cohesive elements are conjunctive, linking the 
first turn to the second with relations related to those in Table 1. For example, if the 
initiating turn is a statement, a possible response may be to disagree with the statement. 
In this case, the response may begin with an “adversative” element (5).  
(5) A: Let’s go to the movies. 
  B: But I don’t want to.  
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As stated before, this relationship between cohesive elements and coherence relations 
offers insight into the discussion in Chapter 3.  
2.3 Computational Conversational/Discourse Analysis 
Though considerable work has been done in the domain of computational 
discourse analysis, interest in multi-party discourse involving more than two parties is 
relatively new, instead favoring single and two-party discourse. Broadly speaking, much 
of computational linguistics that explores language on the document level has focused on 
single-party discourse, since texts typically represent a single-party discourse. The 
following is a sampling of representative papers for single, two, and multi-party 
discourse. We concentrate on a variety of the more popular areas of research in discourse 
including coherence relation identification and topic segmentation and identification.  
For single party discourse (including text and monologue), Mann and 
Thompson’s (1988) Rhetorical Structure Theory (RST) has been used as a framework for 
identifying coherence relations in texts from a single author (Marcu, 1997; Corston-
Oliver, 1998). Marcu and Echihabi (2002) developed an approach to automatically 
identify discourse relations that hold between sentences and within sentence parts from a 
very large corpus of unannotated sentences drawn from textual resources. Grosz and 
Hirschberg (1992) used a Classification and Regression Tree analysis to identify 
discourse segments (building on the theory of discourse discussed in Grosz and Sidner 
(1986)) in Associated Press articles read aloud by news broadcasters. Morris and Hirst 
(1991) explored “Lexical Chains” (spans of related words in a discourse; in this case text) 
as a means for modeling lexical cohesion.  
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In the area of two-party dialog, Stolcke et al. (2000) modeled “dialogue acts” in 
telephone conversations for automatic labeling.4 Forbes-Riley and Litman (2004) used 
acoustic and non-acoustic cues in spoken dialogs to predict the emotional state of 
students in one-on-one interaction with tutors via AdaBoost with decision trees. 
Gurevych and Strube (2004) used (manually disambiguated) noun senses from WordNet 
to summarize the content of telephone-based conversations. Finally, Williams and Young 
(2007) developed an approach for managing spoken human-machine dialogue. 
Much of the existing research on conversation involving three or more parties has 
been conducted using the International Computer Science Institute (ICSI) meeting corpus 
(Janin et al. 2003), though other corpora are available (e.g. TalkBank, which includes 
U.S. Supreme Court oral arguments as a subset of its documents (MacWhinney et al. 
2007)).  Galley et al. (2003) use a lexical cohesion approach to create an unsupervised 
method of topic segmentation in multi-party ICSI meetings, while Purver et al. (2006) 
offer an unsupervised method for topic segmentation and identification using Bayesian 
inference. Galley et al. (2004) used lexical, contextual and durational cues to identify 
agreement and disagreement between speakers turns in ICSI meetings.  
2.4 Quantitative Oral Arguments Research 
To date, there have been several studies dealing with Supreme Court oral 
arguments. Johnson et al. (2009b) examine factors that may be involved in determining 
why and when justices will give a dissent from the bench, including the number of 
questions asked by the Court during oral arguments. This study found a small effect in 
the relationship between dissents from the bench and case activity measured by the 
                                                
4 Dialog acts are often one part of an adjacency pair, e.g. “STATEMENT, QUESTION,…  
AGREEMENT, DISAGREEMENT, and APOLOGY” (Stolcke et al. 2000).   
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number of questions asked during oral arguments. In work related to our first 
experiments, Yuan and Liberman (2008) conducted speaker identification experiments 
using audio transcripts of oral arguments from 78 cases from the 2001 term.5 For the 800 
“clean” test samples used, 98% speaker identification accuracy was achieved by training 
8 justice specific speech recognition models, applying each model to a test utterance, and 
using the model with the highest score to identify the justice.  
We will now discuss several studies aimed at forecasting case outcomes, which 
are summarized in Table 2. Wrightsman (2008) details several attempts to use manual 
quantitative and qualitative analysis to predict votes. The first of these examples recounts 
New York Times Supreme Court reporter Linda Greenhouse’s prediction of case 
outcomes based solely on oral arguments using her experience as a courtroom reporter. 
Of 27 articles she prepared based on oral arguments 17 contained predictions, 12 of 
which were correct (and one held-out because the case was dismissed). The second 
example is an analysis of 28 cases from the 1980 and 2003 terms by John Roberts. By 
determining which side was asked the most questions he was able to determine the 
winner in 24 of those 28 cases studied.  The third is a study by law student Sarah 
Shullman, who attended 10 argument sessions, and recorded information about each 
question asked including the content, the speaker, the level of “hostility”, and the tone of 
the speaker’s voice. After analyzing 7 cases, Shullman also settled on a “most questions 
asked” rule that predicted the winner in 6 of the 7 cases analyzed and the 3 held out 
cases. However, as Wrightsman (2008; 133) notes, “determining what constitutes a 
‘question’ is not so simple”. For example, Wrightsman (2008; 136) writes, “interaction 
                                                
5 Audio transcripts were accompanied by written transcripts, speaker identifications and manual word-
alignment from the OYEZ project (http://www.oyez.org/) (Yuan and Liberman 2008).  
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between advocates and justices do not follow in a discrete manner; two justices may 
begin to speak at the same time, a justice may interrupt an advocate, and justices may 
make elongated statements that may contain several questions.” From an even more basic 
standpoint, it is not clear whether or not researchers limit questions to interrogative 
statements. Without explicitly identifying how questions are to be counted, replicability 
of these sorts of experiments will be inherently shaky.  
 
Study Cases Accuracy Method Manual 
Greenhouse 16 75.0% Experience yes 
Roberts 28 85.7% Most Questions Asked yes 
Shullman 10 90.0% Most Questions Asked yes 
Wrightsman 24 42% Most Questions Asked yes 
Ruger et al. 68 75% Case metadata no 
Johnson et al. ~2000 66.2%/67.5% Most Questions Asked / 
Words Used 
no 
Table 2 Summary of previous studies. ‘Manual’ indicates whether or not the study used manual methods of 
outcome forecasting (the alternative being automatic methods). ‘Cases’ indicates the number of cases tested 
in the study. 
 
The final study discussed in Wrightsman (2008) was conducted by Wrightsman 
and a student. It examined 24 cases from the October 2004 term, 12 of which were 
identified as “very ideological” and 12 of which were identified as “definitely not-
ideological”. For each of these cases they determined whether each justice’s “overall 
pattern of questions” was “unsympathetic” to a particular side in the case, as well as the 
number of questions asked of each side. While no definition of “unsympathetic 
questioning” is provided, they do provide an example of an unsympathetic statement 
from Small v. United States: in arguing for the side of Small, Justice O’Connor said, 
“Congress thinks about the United States, our country, and if it means to say something 
will take place in other places in the world, it says so clearly”.  
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While they do not report absolute accuracy values for the “unsympathetic” 
questioning approach, they do point out that 87% of the unsympathetic comments were 
directed at the losing side in the ideological cases and 69% of the unsympathetic 
comments were directed at the losing side in non-ideological cases.6 Perhaps more 
importantly, they report that the “more questions asked” rule employed by Shullman and 
Roberts led to 42% accuracy. In an attempt to rectify the discrepancy for the “most 
questions asked” rule, results remained mixed, though a potential pattern emerged; 
namely this rule seems to be most useful in ideological cases and least useful in non-
ideological cases.  
 While there has been extensive quantitative study on Supreme Court forecasting, 
computational work has been rather limited with only two studies (Ruger et al. 2002, 
2004 and Johnson et al. 2009a). Ruger et al. (2002, 2004) utilized classification trees built 
from 6 metadata features for 8 years’ worth of Supreme Court cases under Rehnquist 
(658 cases). The metadata used include: 
(1) the circuit of origin for the case; (2) the issue area of the case, coded 
from the petitioner’s brief using Spaeth’s protocol; (3) the type of petitioner (e.g., 
the United States, an injured person, an employer); (4) the type of respondent; (5) 
the ideological direction of the lower court ruling, also coded from the petitioner’s 
brief using Spaeth’s protocol; and (6) whether or not the petitioner argued the 
constitutionality of a law or practice.  
       (Ruger et al. 2004) 
                                                
6 Though presumably not the case, their method of reporting leaves open the extreme possibility that only 
two cases contained unsympathetic questioning and for those two cases 87% and 69% of the unsympathetic 
questions were directed at the losing side. Of course, if this possibility is open, less extreme scenarios about 
the distribution of the questions are possible. In any case, this does not give a clear picture of the accuracy 
provided by this approach.  
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The authors argued that each of these features could be identified by a non-expert, and 
indeed all but the 6th feature can be found in the Spaeth database (Spaeth 2009).  
They used the classification trees to predict cases for the 2002 term prior to the 
case’s decision (68 cases). Finally, results from their classification trees were compared 
to those of legal experts including “71 academics and 12 appellate attorneys”, each of 
whom have “written and taught about, practiced before, and/or clerked at the Supreme 
Court”. The model performed with an absolute accuracy of 75%, while experts performed 
at only 58.8% (with results for 10.3% of cases “inconclusive”). Not reported for this 
timeframe is the proportion of cases decided in favor of the petitioner or respondent. 
However, based on the term they report using and the cases they held out, it appears that 
the Court reversed 69.1% of cases during this period.7  
A more recent and much more comprehensive study was conducted by Johnson et 
al. (2009a). This study examines all cases from 1979 to 1995 (“over 2000 hours”), testing 
the “most questions asked” hypothesis. Two logistic regression models are created in this 
study, the first utilizing the difference in number of questions asked of each side, and the 
second utilizing the difference in number of words used to discuss the case for each side. 
In addition to these two main features, features are included in each model to control for 
potentially confounding factors. These include a “measure of the ideology of the median 
justice on the Court”, the direction of the lower court’s decision, a variable to code the 
interaction of these two previous variables, two variables to code if the Solicitor General 
participated as amicus curiae on behalf of the petitioner and the respondent and two 
variables indicating whether amicus briefs were submitted on behalf of the petitioner 
                                                
7 Note that there is generally a reversal bias, but that this varies over time. 69.1%, however, is somewhat 
higher than the typical rate of reversal which is closer to 64%-66%.  
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and/or on behalf of the respondent. While each of the “questions used” and “words used” 
variables were the least informative variables in each of the models, they report small, but 
noticeable effects for these two models with, 66.2% accuracy for the question difference 
model and 67.5% accuracy for the word difference model. 
While the results show relatively low accuracy, given that the Court’s tendency to 
reverse cases is around 64%, they do provide information to suggest that in extreme cases 
(>2 standard deviations from the mean difference in questions asked) the probability of a 
case being affirmed ranges between 18% and 39%. They report similar correlations with 
the distribution of the difference in words used for each side. Thus these results do 
suggest that despite the conflicting results presented by Wrightsman (2008), there is in 
fact some relevance to the “most questions asked” hypothesis (and more generally, a 
“more attention given” hypothesis). However, as is discussed in Chapter 5, we find that 
for our own data set, the “most questions asked” rule is not predictive across the corpus, 
though, as suggested by Johnston et al. (2009a) it does provide some benefit in the 
extreme cases. 
 Though not explicitly a forecasting study, the work of Johnson et al. (2006, 2007) 
is also closely related to this work. They used Justice Blackmun’s records of the quality 
of arguments by individuals before the Court to examine the relationship between quality 
of oral arguments and case outcomes. In addition to Justice Blackmun’s records, they 
attempted to determine if any other factors such as attorney background and justice and 
attorney policy preferences had an impact on the quality of arguments presented to the 
Court.  Their findings suggest that when the quality of one side’s oral arguments are 
significantly better than another’s, the case is more likely to go to the side with the higher 
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quality arguments, and that an attorney’s background may be helpful in determining the 
quality of arguments they will present.  This advantage is as high as a 77.9% chance of 
reverse when the petitioner’s arguments are “manifestly better” than the respondents, and 
as low as 34.9% chance of reverse in the converse situation.  
2.5 Spaeth Supreme Court Database 
Much of the work in this thesis utilized the Spaeth Supreme Court Database 
(Spaeth 2009; henceforth Spaeth database). The Spaeth database is a comprehensive 
listing of Supreme Court cases and accompanying variables dealing with the 
“background” of the case (e.g. the origin of the case, the parties involved in the case, the 
issue area), “chronological variables” including important dates of the case, the identity 
of the chief justice and the natural court, “substantive variables” such as the issue area of 
the case and the direction of the decision, “outcome variables” including the winner of 
the case, and “voting and opinion variables” identifying the votes and opinions issued in 
the case.  
Often cases can involve multiple legal provisions or issues. In these instances, 
multiple listings are provided for each case. These listings separate variables that would 
otherwise be conflated. As suggested in Benesh (2002) we concentrate on the “case 
citation” listing as we “[want] to study decisions in the aggregate and [want] to count 
each decision only once.” 
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Chapter 3  Sequence Labeling8 
 
 
The work contained in this section aims to address our first objective; to 
demonstrate that conversational patterns exist in Supreme Court oral arguments. This is 
accomplished by constructing a sequence labeling task that identifies speakers from turn 
content. Given a sequence labeling task, if speakers can be identified from the content of 
the turns and increasing the turn history in a model for sequence labeling improves 
performance, it indicates that patterns exist in the turn-taking behavior of Supreme Court 
justices.  
In a typical labeling task the objective is to identify present, but unobservable 
information (hidden variables) from observable information (observed variables). An 
example of a common sequence labeling task is part-of-speech (POS) tagging. In POS 
tagging, the objective is to identify the parts-of-speech (e.g. noun, adjective, preposition, 
determiner, conjunction, etc.) for words in a sentence. Framed as a sequence labeling 
problem, the hidden variables are the POS of each word and, in the simplest case, the 
observed variables are the words. Because the same words in different sequences may 
have different POS, one usually wants to make use not only of the words themselves, but 
of sequential information as well, such as the order of words or the sequence of the 
predicted POSs. Because of this, POS tagging is often approached with graph based 
statistical models that can easily make use both of the features in a sequence (i.e. words) 
and the sequence itself (e.g. DeRose 1988, Lafferty et al. 2001, Toutanova et al. 2003).  
                                                
8 This work was originally published in Hawes et al. (2009). Figures in the following Sections are from this 
paper. Other discussion will either closely coincide with or match the content of this paper. Discussion is 
expanded and details are included to highlight the relevance of this work to this thesis.  
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Similar to POS tagging, we can construct a task where the observable information 
is a sequence of turns, and the hidden variables are the identities of the speaker for each 
turn. Supreme Court transcripts prior to 2004 offer an immediately relevant example, as 
justices were not uniquely identified for these cases.   
3.1 Methods 
Data Preparation 
Though the cases used for each experiment set vary, all experiments share a 
common data preparation approach. Transcripts of oral arguments are posted the same 
day a case is argued in PDF format. Transcription is conducted by the Courtroom 
reporter, Alderson Reporting Company. While details of the transcription process are not 
given, the character and infrequency of errors would indicate that transcripts are created 
manually.9 For each segment of speech by a single speaker, transcripts contain the 
speaker’s name (i.e. Speaker ID) and the content of the speech segment. For all 
experiments, each segment is treated as one speaker turn and thus the transcript is treated 
as an approximation of the turn sequence during the entire case.10 Finally, transcripts 
contain several non-content items including opening and closing time stamps and headers 





                                                
9 For example, typos in speaker IDs (i.e. non-content text) such as JUSTICE KENNY instead of JUSTICE 
KENNEDY, or JUDGE ALITO instead of JUSTICE ALITO.  
10 Of course, this sequence can only be an approximation; there is no duration information, only coarse 
overlap information, and other discourse information such as fillers (i.e. um) are often disregarded.  
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Symbol Examples 
TIME (11:08 a.m.),  
(Whereupon, at 12:08 p.m., the case in the above-entitled 
matter was submitted.) 
START-ORAL ORAL ARGUMENT OF JEAN-CLAUDE ANDRE ON 
BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER,  
ORAL ARGUMENT OF KANNON SHANMUGAM ON 
BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENTS 
START-REBUTTAL REBUTTAL ARGUMENT OF JEAN-CLAUDE ANDRE 
ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER 
Table 3 Examples of non-content items from the transcript of the oral arguments from Ali v. Federal 
Bureau of Prisons (06-9130) with the special symbols used to identify these items in our experiments. 
 
 
All transcript PDFs were converted to XML format using an off the shelf utility, 
followed by custom built automatic cleanup to remove extraneous formatting. Cleanup 
code and cleaned transcripts will be made available at 
http://www.umiacs.umd.edu/~twhawes/oralarguments/index.html. 
Corpus Description 
At the beginning of this study the Court’s 2007 term had not yet completed, and 
prior to the 2004 term justices did not have unique speaker IDs. Thus we limited the 
corpus to the 2004-2006 terms. For the sake of consistency, we also filtered out cases that 
followed an atypical format.11 For example, those cases that included arguments from 
amici curiae.  
Feature extraction 
From the XML formatted cases we extracted the case content including: speaker 
IDs, speaker turn content and non-content items in the transcript. Turns were extracted as 
speaker ID/content pairs. From the content of each turn, we extracted features as shown 
in the Features Section (c.f. Figure 3).  
                                                
11 Filtered out cases include: 02-1472, 04-1067, 04-473b (Garcetti v. Ceballos (Reargued)), 04-944, 05-
1342, 05-1575, 05-204, 05-705, 05-746, 05-9222, 06-484, 06-5247, 06-5306, 06-593, 105 Orig. (Kansas v. 
Colorado) and 128 Orig. (Alaska v. United States). 
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Labeling 
We extract from each unit x a set x  of features, and our models predict the labels 
yi for a sequence, yielding {( 1x  , y1 ), . . . , ( nx  , yn )}. The labels yi comprise a set of 15 
symbols: 11 for the justices (one for each), one to represent the lawyers (either on behalf 
of the petitioner or respondent), plus one special symbol for time stamps and two 
additional special symbols to encode the section headings (i.e. START-ORAL and 
START-REBUTTAL).  
Figure 1 shows the frequency with which each of the justices spoke across all 
cases in the corpus. Not included are the non-justice parties from each side, who produce 
47.4% of all turns. Also not included are the special symbols, which comprise 2.2% of 
symbols in the corpus. While the Court is only composed of 9 justices at any given time, 
we report 11 in Figure 1 due to changes in court membership, including Robert’s 
replacement of Rehnquist and Alito’s replacement of O’Connor. Because these justices 
do not span this entire corpus, their empirical probability should be lower than that of the 
justices’ true tendency to speak during oral arguments (this, in turn, has an impact on our 




Figure 1 Empirical probability of each justice symbol in the corpus (Hawes et al. 2009). 
 
Because we are predicting sequential labels from a collection of features, 
conditional random fields (CRFs; Lafferty, McCallum, & Pereira, 2001) are a 
straightforward choice for this task. CRFs utilize undirected graphs to model the 
conditional probability of an unobserved sequence of labels (Y) given some observable 
sequence of features (X). CRFs are preferable to Hidden Markov Models (HMMs) in 
many sequence-labeling tasks because they relax stringent conditional independence 
assumptions made by generative models. CRFs have been empirically shown to work 
well for a variety of text processing tasks, including POS tagging (Lafferty et al. 2001), 
shallow parsing (Sha & Pereira, 2003), and named-entity recognition in the biomedical 
domain (Settles, 2004). Although the underlying structure of a CRF can take a variety of 
forms, a linear chain of labels (Figure 2) is often assumed for sequence-labeling tasks 
because they allow for efficient inference and decoding using the forward-backward and 
Viterbi algorithms (Sutton and McCallum 2006). Figure 2 corresponds to a first-order 
CRF, which determines probabilities using features at the current label along with the 
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previous label; similarly, a second-order CRF corresponds to a model that determines 
probabilities using features at the current label along with the previous two labels.  For 
this work we used the MALLET implementation of CRFs (http://mallet.cs.umass.edu). 
 
Figure 2 Diagram of a linear chain of labels, where Xi is a group of observed features and Yi is a label  
 
Features 
 The following is a discussion of the features used for this task. Note that an 
additional, contentless feature (T) was also used for every turn in order to ensure that all 
turns had at least one feature in the sequence. 
Unigrams 
 Unique tokens, white space and punctuation separated, were extracted from each 
turn, ignoring stop-words. One feature for each token used in a particular turn was 
included in the feature set for that turn indicating the presence of that token. By including 
unigrams in our feature set, we are essentially creating a “bag-of-words” language model. 
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Because this is among the simplest possible approaches for this task, we treat unigrams as 
our baseline feature set.  
Discourse Markers (DM) 
 All interpretable discourse is composed of discourse relations, which serve to 
connect each unit of discourse. Correct interpretation of these relations is necessary in 
order to correctly interpret a discourse. Because we can safely assume that oral arguments 
are an interpretable discourse (at least for all parties involved) we can infer the presence 
of these coherence relations, not only between an individual speaker’s utterance but 
between the utterances of separate speakers. Instead of attempting to identify all of these 
relations automatically, however, we instead rely on discourse markers, which have 
traditionally been viewed as overt cues for underlying discourse relations (cf. conjunctive 
cohesive elements, Section 2.2).  
 Both semantically and syntactically optional, discourse markers are typically 
viewed as pragmatic units used to link clauses in a discourse (Schiffrin 1987). As overt 
cues of discourse relations, discourse markers are a prime example of conjunctive 
cohesive elements of a discourse. For this task, we compiled a list of approximately 700 
potential discourse markers identified through manual examination of the corpus and in 
the literature (Marcu, 1997; Oates, 2001).12 Finally, we make the simplifying assumption 
that any turn initial string that matches a member of this list is a discourse marker; a 
condition met in approximately 50% of turns. If multiple adjacent discourse markers 
appear at the beginning of the string, all were included. Consider an example from 
                                                
12 Manual examination of the corpus may be seen as viewing test data prior to testing. The author readily 
admits this list would have ideally been compiled from out-of-sample documents. However, note that the 
task is to examine the impact of discourse markers, not to identify discourse markers. Because all potential 
discourse markers were included using this method, we view this as parallel to annotations in the test data 
for a task that requires such information. 
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Kansas v. Marsh (Reargued) (2006): “JUSTICE BREYER: Okay, well, what do you say 
to –”, from which we extract two discourse markers (italicized). Because the discourse 
marker list is composed of both single and multi-word discourse markers, and because 
the majority of single word discourse markers are also stop-words, there is very little 
overlap between the Unigram feature set and the DM feature set.  
Personal Reference (Ref) 
 Finally, we included a feature set for references to individuals. This feature set 
included four types of features: justice’s names, honorifics (i.e. “Your Honor”), second 
person pronouns, a single feature for any justices mentioned, and a single feature for 
every non-justice name.13 Instances of these features were identified using simple pattern 
matching, which we found to be sufficient for most instances of address due to the formal 
nature of Supreme Court discourse. Thus, this works well as a basic model for direct 
address closely related to that discussed in Jovanovic and Akker (2004).  
However, one should note that as a consequence of using simple pattern matching 
and no additional or more sophisticated approaches, all instances of reference are 
included regardless of the referent. While a subset of these references include direct 
references to an individual who either spoke or will speak in adjacent turns, the direct 
address feature set also includes references to individuals present, but not currently 
participating in the discourse, and to individuals who are not participating in the 
discourse at all. While each of these different classes of “individual mention” make a 
distinct contribution, each contribution made is potentially useful in modeling the 
                                                
13 The second to last feature was included to account for highly variable mentions of justices that were not 
serving on the Supreme Court during the case.  A single feature was used in this final case because of the 
high variability across cases of non-justice names. Note however, that the majority of these latter namings 
within a case typically refer to the party currently presenting oral arguments or other individuals involved 
in the case.  
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conversational dynamics of the Court. Because references are typically made to someone 
who recently spoke or will speak (because they have been addressed), for each turn we 
include the reference features from the immediately adjacent turns but not the current 
turn. Approximately 40% of turns contained at least one instance of personal reference. 
Finally, as with discourse markers, because unigrams are filtered for stop-words and 
contain only single tokens there was little overlap between the direct address features and 
the unigram features. Figure 3 provides an example of the features extracted from a 
sequence of turns.  
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Turns from S. D. Warren Co. v. Maine Bd. of Environmental Protection 
(04-1527) 
JUSTICE SOUTER: -- "reinforcing," and maybe it's "changing." I mean, 
you're characterizing it one way. We start with a different canon of 
meaning, and that is that we look to the words around which, in 
connection with which, the word is used. In here, it's being used 
without certain modifiers or descriptive conditions. In other cases, 
it is being used with them. And that's a good reason to think that 
probably the word is intended to mean something different in those 
situations. 
MR. KAYATTA: Well, I would -- I would hesitate, Justice Souter, to 
go from taking a specific word, like "discharge," and, therefore, 
saying that it meant something that is both more general and much 
more easily set. 
JUSTICE SOUTER: No, but your argument, I thought, was simply this, 
that it uses "discharge" in, you know, X number -- I forget how many 
you had -- and it's perfectly clear that in most of those instances 
it requires an addition; and, therefore, it should be construed as 
requiring it here. My point was that in a great many of those 
instances, the statute is not merely using the word in isolation; 
it's using it in connection with a couple of other words, like 
"discharge a pollutant." And it, therefore, number one, makes sense 
to construe "discharge of a pollutant" differently from "discharge." 




Unigrams: cases, word, start, changing, connection, words, 
modifiers, meaning, reinforcing, reason, situations, intended, 
characterizing, good, canon, descriptive, conditions 
Discourse Markers: - 
Direct Address: you 
Kayatta 1: 
Unigrams: meant, discharge, word, set, justice, souter, easily, 
taking, specific, general, hesitate 
Discourse Markers: well 
Direct Address: Justice_Souter, JUSTICE 
Souter 2:  
Unigrams: argument, simply, requires, sense, discharge, construe, 
clear, thought, construed, point, number, great, word, connection, 
requiring, forget, words, couple, addition, differently, perfectly, 
statute, instances, isolation, pollutant, makes 
Discourse Markers: no, but 





For our experiments we utilized four combinations of features: 
• Unigrams (Unigrams) 
• Unigrams plus Discourse Marker Features (Unigrams + DM) 
• Unigrams plus Personal Reference Features (Unigrams + Ref) 
• Unigrams plus Discourse Markers plus Personal Reference (Unigrams + DM + 
REF)   
With these features we conducted sequence prediction using both first and second order 
CRFs.  
 All experiments were evaluated using k-fold cross validation. k-fold cross 
validation is a common evaluation technique wherein data is segmented into any number 
(i.e. k) of non-overlapping subsets of instances, or folds, where k is less than or equal to 
the number of individual instances in the data set. For each subset si of the k subsets, a 
model is trained on the other k-1 subsets, and then evaluated using si as a test set. Finally, 
results from each iteration of testing are combined, typically through averaging (as in our 
experiments). We used 10-fold cross validation to evaluate our first-order models and 2-
fold cross validation to evaluate our second-order models.14  
Results 
 Results are reported as the F-score for sequence prediction. F-score is the 
harmonic mean of precision and recall. We used an equally weighted F-score as the 
simplest measure of precision and recall. Figure 4 shows the 10-fold cross validation 
                                                
14 The choice to use 2-fold cross validation for second order models was based on the significantly longer 
training time for this order of CRF as compared to first order CRFs.  
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results using first order CRFs. We report only those justices who regularly spoke in cases 
during their time on the bench and no other symbols.15 Each justice category has been 




Figure 4 1st CRF 10-fold Cross-Validation Results. Annotations represent the relative improvement over 
Unigram baseline for the Unigram + DM +Ref condition (Hawes et al. 2009) 
 
For the Unigrams + DM and Unigrams + Ref conditions we see relative improvement 
over Unigrams for all justices; however, there is variability across justices as to which of 
the two provides the greatest relative improvement. The use of both personal reference 
and discourse markers, in addition to unigrams, provides greater relative improvement 
than all other conditions for each justice.  
 Figure 5 shows the 2-fold cross validation results for second order CRFs. As with 
the first order graphs, justice categories have been annotated with relative improvement 
                                                
15 Thus we do not report section headers, the TIME symbol, the L symbol or Thomas (who spoke too 
infrequently to model).  
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from the Unigram condition to the Unigram + DM + Ref condition. For all justices but 
Alito and Rehnquist we see a relative improvement in all conditions as well as a similar 
pattern across conditions within justices. The decrease in performance for Alito and 
Rehnquist is to be expected given that these two justices cover the smallest portions of 
the corpus compared to all other justices who speak regularly. Because of this, sequences 
with their symbols appear infrequently across the corpus, and so will either be less evenly 
distributed throughout cross-validation folds or contain less training data per fold. The 
overall increase in F-score for all other justices (as compared to Figure 4) in all 
conditions indicates that increasing speaker history is, as expected, beneficial in modeling 
justice turn-taking behavior. It would appear that the second-order CRF allows us to 
capture both complex interactions between justices as well as individual justices’ 
tendency to continue speaking to a lawyer without interruption from other justices.  
 
 
Figure 5 2nd order CRF 2-fold Cross-Validation Results. Annotations represent the relative improvement 
over Unigram baseline for the Unigram + DM +Ref condition (Hawes et al. 2009) 
 
 33 
 Figure 6 contains the overall accuracy for both first and second order CRFs in 
each condition, where accuracy is simply the proportion of correct predictions to the total 
number of predictions. Each bar has been annotated with its relative improvement over 
unigrams for their respective model orders. Error bars were calculated as the 95% 
confidence interval as computed by the Clopper-Pearson method for inferring exact 
binomial confidence intervals (Clopper & Pearson, 1934). The confidence intervals 
indicate that for both first and second order models, the inclusion of discourse markers or 
personal reference features provides a significant improvement over unigrams alone, 
though these two conditions are not significantly different from each other. However, the 
inclusion of both feature sets does provide a significant improvement over both of these 
conditions for both first and second order models.  
 
 
Figure 6 Overall accuracy of first and second order CRFs. Bars are annotated with the relative 
improvement over Unigram baseline. Error bars are the 95% confidence interval as calculated by the 




 Interestingly, these results show that the inclusion of features such as discourse 
markers and instances of personal reference do add information that help in identifying 
who was speaking when in a discourse. While the results are considerably lower than the 
acoustic approach to speaker identification of Yuan and Liberman (2008) it should be 
noted that while our tasks are related, they are also distinct. Their work focuses on the use 
of acoustic differences in individuals’ speech and how this can be applied to speaker 
identification in acoustically complex environments. In contrast, our work aims to 
understand the turn-taking patterns of justices in the Supreme Court through the 
relationship between turn content and turn organization, and we use speaker identification 
as a task to gauge our progress towards this goal. These results provide significant 
improvement over a unigram baseline model, and we see significant improvement from 
first order models to second order models. This indicates the existence of high-level 
patterns in justice turn organization during Supreme Court oral arguments.  
Though we are looking for positive results with our work, we are also looking for 
tools to help legal scholars. How then, might these results or this work in general be used 
as such? The fact that we have identified predictable patterns in turn-taking may be of 
interest to legal scholars. Though they may have had such an intuition about the Court 
(perhaps, noting that there is a pecking order amongst the justices, with the chief justice 
at the top, followed by the other justices organized by seniority), these results make this 
fact explicit. Additionally, the work presented here is a novel approach for understanding 
the Supreme Court. By utilizing these methods, legal scholars will have new tools for 
addressing questions about the Supreme Court, and a variety of new questions.  
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Chapter 4 Visualizing Dynamics 
 
This chapter addresses the second goal of this thesis, to demonstrate that the 
patterns indicated in the previous chapter can be associated with case outcomes. To 
accomplish this, we explore the relationship between turn-taking patterns during oral 
arguments and case outcomes, via a multi-dimensional charting technique. We created 
charts for sets of cases belonging to a variety of outcomes and case conditions, and 
examine the relationship between justices’ voting record and their turn-taking behavior in 
these conditions. By comparing these charts we create a picture of the relationship 
between the voting and conversational behavior of justices.  
In this Chapter, as well as the next, we deal with justices’ ideology. This is often 
discussed throughout the media, and often held as common knowledge. However, there 
have been a number of studies quantitatively examining the ideology of justices. For 
example, Martin-Quinn scores estimate the “ideal point” (i.e. a point on an attitudinal 
scale, in this case ideology) for each justice (Martin and Quinn 2002). Martin-Quinn 
scores are regularly published at http://mqscores.wustl.edu/measures.php.  On the Martin-
Quinn scale, negative numbers indicate a liberal ideology while positive numbers indicate 
a conservative ideology. Table 4 summarizes the mean Martin-Quinn score for the 















Table 4 Mean Martin-Quinn scores for the 2005-2007 terms. Note, negative scores indicate a liberal 
ideology and positive scores indicate a conservative ideology. The higher (lower) the number the more 
conservative (liberal) the ideal point is. 
 
 
4.1 Methods  
Corpus description 
While the source and format of documents for this corpus is the same as that in 
Chapter 3, we selected a different timeframe. For this work, transcripts corresponding to 
cases from the February 2006 argument session (2005 Term) through the April 2008 
argument session (2007 Term) were collected. This selection of cases represents a 
“natural court”, a period of time during which the same 9 justices were in office with no 
changes in court membership. These justices include Chief Justice Roberts, Justice 
Stevens, Justice Souter, Justice Ginsburg, Justice Kennedy, Justice Thomas, Justice Alito, 
Justice Scalia and Justice Breyer. By using a natural court, we avoid potentially 
erroneous factors introduced by changes in court membership. Additionally, it increases 
our chances of avoiding the case where significantly less data is available for an 
individual justice due to factors external to that justice’s behavior. While it would have 
been preferable to use more data, there is no longer natural court after the 2004 term; 
before then individual justices were not uniquely identified in argument transcripts. Of 
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the 179 cases argued during this period, 11 were held out due to inconsistencies in the 
database used for labeling each case.16  
Case Segmentation 
Cases were segmented into sequences of speaker labels. Each sequence was then 
divided into “speaker trigrams”. Those familiar with the traditional view of trigrams, will 
recognize our interpretation of speaker trigrams. A speaker trigram is SiSi+1Si+2 where Si 
is the speaker of the ith turn in the sequence (Manning and Schütze 1999). Figure 7 
contains some example turns from the corpus (truncated for brevity), along with the 
sequence extracted from these turns and the resulting trigrams. We then obtained the 
count for each trigram across all cases and for all cases in each one of several conditions 
from the Spaeth database (e.g. direction of case decision, direction of Alito’s votes, vote 
split, etc.). 
 
                                                
16 Held out cases include: 04-607, 05-204, 05-259, 06-1265, 06-1666, 06-618, 06-7517, 07-290, 07-330, 




Figure 7 Sequence of truncated turns, the sequence extracted from these turns and the resulting trigrams. 
 
Labeling description 
Labels were created using the Spaeth database. We experimented with variables 
along several dimensions including the direction of individual justices’ and the Court’s 
decision in cases (liberal/conservative) and the Court’s vote split (5-4, 9-0, 8-1, etc). 
While we discuss only a sampling of charts in this chapter, all charts with greater than 10 
cases for each variable value are included in Appendix A. In the Sections that follow we 
will cover the Vote Split (VOTE) variable, which contains the distribution of votes for a 
case, the Direction (DIR) variable, which contains the ideological direction of the case 
outcome and Justice Direction variables (JDIR) which contain the ideological direction 
of each justice’s vote in a particular case.  
From Snyder v. Louisiana (06-10119) 
CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Even though -- even though you’re theory… 
MR. BRIGHT: Oh, no. 
CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: -- that this jury did not return a… 
MR. BRIGHT: No. Let me -- let me make this quite… 
CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Thank you, Mr. Bright. Mr. Boudreaux… 
ORAL ARGUMENT OF TERRY M. BOUDREAUX ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT 
MR. BOUDREAUX: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please… 
JUSTICE SCALIA: As to life imprisonment or as to the… 
MR. BOUDREAUX: As to life imprisonment, Your Honor… 
JUSTICE SCALIA: Where is this? I -- 364? Show me -- 
MR. BOUDREAUX: Beginning at 364 of the joint appendix… 
 
Extracted Sequence: 
ROBE L ROBE L ROBE START-ORAL L SCAL L SCAL L  
 
Trigrams: 
ROBE L ROBE, L ROBE L, ROBE L ROBE, L ROBE START-ORAL, ROBE START-
ORAL L, START-ORAL L SCAL, L SCAL L, SCAL L SCAL, L SCAL L 
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The Rose Charts 
Though radial plots have been explored extensively, use of radial plots for the 
visualization of sequential patterns and associated variables is a novel application of this 
layout (Draper et al. 2009). The outer ring of our diagrams (the petals in our terminology) 
is related to polar plots discussed by Draper et al (2009), while the inner ring is a pie 
chart. Because these charts are a novel application of radial layouts, we include the 
following technical description. For an explanation of how to interpret the charts, proceed 
to the Results Section (Section 4.2). 
For each justice (except Thomas, again because of his infrequency of speaking) 
we created charts for all trigrams ending with that justice (i.e. all trigrams represented in 
a chart must end with the same Si+3, where Si+3 is a justice). By concentrating only on 
those trigrams that end with the same justice, we can concentrate on turns that can be 
associated with “choice” on the part of that justice (i.e. the choice of that justice to speak 
after the speakers in the first and second positions in the trigram). We interpret this 
“choice” as the choice to interact with or pay attention to previous speakers. However, 
this is not necessarily the case; for example, these turns may arise if the justice is 
attempting to change the topic, and thus not paying attention to the previous speakers in 
the usual sense. Secondly, we chose to concentrate only on “typical” trigrams; because 
the vast majority of trigrams are of the form JUSTICE LAYWER JUSTICE or LAWYER 
JUSTICE LAWYER, all trigrams that did not have a lawyer in the second position were 
filtered out.  
The center of each chart contains a pie graph representing the proportion of times 
the justice in the third position also spoke in the first position (i.e. Si = Si+3; “held the 
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floor” after the lawyer’s turn).17 Each of the outer petals represents one of the other 
justices that spoke in the first position (i.e. all other Si). The width of each outer petal 
represents the frequency of each turn sequence normalized by the number of times Si 
spoke, relative to the other petals. Thus, if the justice in the center devotes equal attention 
to all other justices (e.g. that justice follows-up on the same proportion of the turns 
produced by each other justice) all petals will have equal width. Because this looks at the 
proportion of turns rather than the count, the petals would be of equal width even if the 
frequencies of the sequences they represent are different. Petal radius represents the 
proportion of time with which two justices voted together, where shorter petals indicate 
the justices have more similar voting records than justices with longer petals. The inner 
dotted ring indicates 100% matching votes, and the outer edge of the chart area indicates 
100% mismatch. Each object in the chart (petals and the pie graph) are colored on a 
gradient according to the proportion of cases in which that justices voted liberally or 
conservatively in the given category (i.e. that justices exhibited ideology), where white 
(blue in color versions) is liberal and gray (red in color versions) is conservative. We use 
counts of votes rather than Martin-Quinn scores because of the high variability of 
conditions chosen and because we want to represent the ideology within each condition. 
Note that because the range varies from condition to condition and because the range can 
often be quite narrow, the gradient is calculated within a condition, thus, a justice’s color 
may vary from condition to condition. Finally, each petal is annotated with two values. 
The percent on the top, which is also in bold, is the width of the petal, while the percent 
                                                
17 We take the idea of “holding-the-floor” beyond the typical interpretation of maintaining control of a turn, 
to all instances where a speaker continues to produce turns after a single interceding turn from another 
speaker.  
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on the bottom represents the proportion of times that n-gram occurred compared to all 
other petals.  
By representing turn-taking information in this way we hope to be able to capture 
broad patterns of the justices’ turn-taking behavior. If we compare charts for different 
values within a condition, patterns may emerge that indicate a relationship between the 
values of that condition and a justice’s behavior. For example, if we compare the turn-
taking behavior of a justice when his or her vote is liberal to when the vote is 
conservative, and we note that a petal for a particular justice is short and narrow for 
liberal votes but long and wide for conservative votes, this could indicate that the justice 
in question has a greater tendency to follow-up on the particular justice of that petal in 
conservative cases. Furthermore, when the petal is long and wide, we may hypothesize 
that many of those follow-ups in some way challenge the justice of the petal since the 
length of the petal indicates the level of disagreement in the cases’ outcomes.  
4.2 Results 
How to read the charts 
Some of the patterns we discuss will be relevant either to wings of the Court or to 
justices from those wings. In these cases we will treat Kennedy, the swing justice, as 
irrelevant to these patterns. Additionally, we will identify speculative explanations for 
these patterns with italic text at the end of an observation.  
Take, for example, Figure 8 “Stevens – Rose Diagram of All Cases”. This chart 
contains all cases from our dataset. Because this chart is for Stevens, we find a pie chart 
in the center labeled Stevens, which indicates Stevens tends to “hold the floor”, i.e. 
speaks again after an initial turn directed at the lawyer, ~75%  of the time (signified by 
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the area filled in for the pie chart).  It also shows that his voting record is one of the most 
liberal for this set of cases at, ~ 31% conservative votes (indicated by the color gradient).  
 
 
Figure 8 Stevens - Rose Diagram of All Cases 
 
 
As discussed above, the outer petals represent all turn sequences in the dataset of 
the pattern JUSTICE1 LAWYER JUSTICE2 (J1 L J2) where J1 !  J2, and in this case J2 is 
Stevens. Thus, the petal labeled Kennedy represents all turn sequences of the form 
Kennedy Lawyer Stevens. The labels for this petal indicate that Stevens follows Kennedy 
17.9% of the time when Stevens is not “holding the floor” and that the normalized 
proportion of this sequence is 21.6%. For Scalia, the relationship between these values is 
reversed, with the normalized proportion much lower than the unnormalized proportion. 
This indicates that while Stevens follows up on Scalia more often than he does Kennedy, 
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he does so on a smaller proportion of the turns produced by Scalia as compared to 
Kennedy. Finally, comparing the length of the Kennedy petal to the others, we see that 
Stevens votes with Kennedy less often than the liberal justices but more often than the 
conservative justices.   
Looking at the outer petals we can make a number of generalizations, several of 
which are covered here in a top down fashion: 
• Stevens has a greater tendency to follow-up on Kennedy, Scalia, Alito and 
Roberts (the justices he least often votes with) as a group than he does Ginsburg, 
Breyer and Souter (the justices he most often votes with).  
• Holding Kennedy out as the swing vote, Stevens’s interaction is much more 
evenly split between the conservative and liberal wings of the Court, with only 
slightly more follow-ups on justices he agrees with less often than ones he does 
agree with (40% vs. 38.3%).  Thus, this indicates a somewhat disproportionate 
amount of attention given to Kennedy. This may indicate that Stevens more often 
treats Kennedy as a “potentially persuadable justice”, spending more time trying 
to convince him than other justices.  
• While the normalized proportion is fairly evenly spread out between the 
conservative justices in this chart, for the liberal justices, attention is skewed 
towards Ginsburg (18.3% towards Ginsburg vs. 9.9% and 10.1% towards Breyer 
and Souter). This may indicate regular cooperation between Stevens and 
Ginsburg.   
• Of all justices Stevens is most likely to follow-up on Kennedy, at 21.6%, followed 
by Ginsburg at 18.3%.  
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• Finally, Roberts and Scalia both have much higher absolute percents compared to 
the relative percents, indicating that Stevens is less likely to follow-up on one of 
their turns despite a larger number of opportunities, indicating a greater 
proportion of turns go ignored from these justices.  
• The absolute percent is much lower than the scaled relative percent for Alito, 
indicating a stronger tendency for Stevens to follow-up on Alito given the 
opportunity as compared to other justices, indicating Alito’s turns are less often 
ignored as compared to Roberts and Scalia. These last two observations together 
may indicate a tendency to argue with Alito more often than other justices in the 
conservative wing. 
Vote Split Condition (VOTE) 
The VOTE variable in the Spaeth database indicates the distribution of the 
justices’ votes (e.g. 5-4, 8-1, 9-0, etc.). Using this variable, we can test our intuitions 
about the sorts of patterns the charts will exhibit because we have well defined 
expectations for several features of the graph in this condition.  
Figure 9, Kennedy – Rose Diagrams for 5-4 and 9-0 split cases, exhibits several 
patterns we would expect:  
• 9-0 cases have maximal agreement between the justices; logically, if their 
decisions were unanimous then their votes always match. 
• In 9-0 cases, justices always exhibit the same ideology. Their votes always match, 
thus their decisions have the same ideological direction. 
• In 5-4 cases, Kennedy shows relatively high levels of disagreement with all 
justices, but slightly more agreement with conservative justices than with liberal 
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justices. We expect this pattern given that Kennedy is a slightly conservative 
swing justice, often casting the deciding vote in narrowly decided cases.  
• In 5-4 cases, Kennedy exhibits an ideology in the center of the gradient while the 
other justices exhibit ideologies along the extremes of the gradient. This is what 
we would expect if Kennedy is the median justice and the other justices typically 
vote along their ideology in narrowly decided cases.  
• Finally, in 5-4 cases, the petal width for Alito is very narrow, both compared to 
the other justices in 5-4 cases and compared to Altio’s petal in 9-0 cases. Also, 
Alito has the shortest petal in 5-4 cases. This may indicate that Kennedy tends to 




Figure 9 Kennedy – Rose Diagrams for 5-4 and 9-0 split cases 
 
 
 This pair of diagrams confirms our intuitions about the agreement and ideology 
patterns we expect to see when they are logically predictable. Additionally, the last bullet 
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point demonstrates the sorts of patterns that we can find when comparing levels of 
interaction across values in a condition.   
Direction Condition (DIR) 
The DIR variable in the Spaeth database indicates the ideological direction of a 
case’s outcome. The ideological direction of a decision is determined based on the parties 
involved in the case and the issue area of the case according to the rules outlined in the 
Spaeth database documentation.  Ideological direction is either liberal or conservative 
except in rare circumstances when no appropriate ideological direction can be 
determined. Below we discuss three diagram pairs in the DIR condition. In all charts, 
conservative decisions are on the right and liberal decisions are on the left.  
Several observations can be made in Figure 10, Alito - Rose Diagrams for the 
DIR Condition (Alito is a conservative justice):  
• When the eventual outcome of the case is conservative, Alito follows up on the 
liberal wing more frequently than when the outcome is liberal. This suggests a 
greater level of interaction via the lawyer between Alito and the liberal wing of 
the Court in cases that are eventually decided conservatively.   
• There is less interaction between Alito and the conservative justices when the 
outcome is liberal as opposed to conservative. It should be noted that this is not 
the logical converse of the previous observation as the presence of a swing 
justices allows for changes in only one wing across a condition. These two 
observations may indicate a slight tendency to argue more with justices that Alito 
disagrees with in cases where the outcome is likely to be against Alito’s ideology.  
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• These charts indicate an increase in interaction with Kennedy when the eventual 
outcome of the case is liberal. For example, it is reasonable to assume that in any 
given case, each justice (in this instance, Alito) will have a fairly accurate 
expectation regarding the eventual outcome of the case. So, if Alito suspects that 
the eventual outcome of the case will be liberal (and especially if the case is likely 
to be split), Alito is likely to seek the support of Kennedy as a swing vote, which 
may likely be indicated as a higher degree of interaction.  
  
 
Figure 10 Alito - Rose Diagrams for the DIR Condition. 
 
 In the DIR condition for Ginsburg (Figure 11), we note the opposite basic patterns 
to those of Alito (Ginsburg is a liberal justice):  
• In conservative cases we see a higher level of interaction with the liberal wing and 
a lower level of interaction when compared to liberal cases.  
• We also see more interaction with Kennedy in conservative cases than liberal 
cases.   
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However, since Ginsburg and Alito are from opposing wings for the Court, these 
patterns can be used to form a single generalization. Namely, when the eventual outcome 
of a case is in opposition to the justice’s general ideology, there is increased interaction 
with that justice’s own wing, and decreased interaction with the opposing wing, as 
compared to cases when the outcome is inline with the justice’s ideology. This pattern is 
observed for 5 of the 7 applicable justices (Kennedy excluded for the reason above and 
Thomas because he rarely speaks). Similarly, when a case’s eventual outcome is against a 
justice’s ideology, more interaction with the swing justice is observed than when the 
eventual outcome of the case is inline with the justice’s ideology.  
 
 
Figure 11 Ginsburg - Rose Diagrams for the DIR Condition. 
 
 In the above cases, Kennedy was treated as irrelevant to the patterns under 
discussion because he is the swing justice. Despite this, we can still make observations 
regarding Kennedy’s interaction with the other justices. Figure 12 contains the DIR 
condition charts for Kennedy.  
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• Kennedy is more consistent than the previous justices we have discussed, when 
looking at his interaction with wings of the Court. He has only slightly higher 
interaction with the liberal justices in liberal cases and conservative justices in 
conservative cases. We might expect this from a swing justice. 
• For each value in the DIR condition, for Kennedy there is a decrease in the 
proportion of follow-ups to the most liberal justice in that condition. That is, 
Stevens is the most liberal justice in cases with a conservative outcome while 
Ginsburg is the most liberal justice when the outcome is liberal; we see that 
Kennedy interacts with Stevens less when the outcome is conservative (i.e. he is 
the most liberal justice in conservative cases) and less interaction with Ginsburg 
when the outcome is liberal (i.e. she is the most liberal justice in liberal cases). 
This could indicate a reluctance to get involved with the most extreme (liberal) 
viewpoint during a case.  
 
 
Figure 12 Kennedy - Rose Diagrams for the DIR Condition. 
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Justice Direction (JDIR) 
 Similar to the DIR condition, the JDIR condition has two primary values, liberal 
(L) and conservative (C); however, unlike DIR there is one JDIR value for each justice. 
So, ALTODIR (Alito’s Direction) identifies the ideological direction of Alito’s vote in a 
particular case. Note that no variable named JDIR appears in the Spaeth database, which 
instead contains one variable for each justice. We are simply using the name JDIR as 
shorthand for these variables. While other comparisons are possible, below we 
concentrate on charts comparing justices within their own JDIR condition. That is, for 
Alito we only present ALTODIR, for Breyer we only present BRYDIR, etc.  
Figure 13 presents the two values for Alito in the ALTODIR condition. Note that 
because this is the ALTODIR condition, we expect that Alito will be on the extreme end 
of the ideology gradient in this case group (logically, if the value is conservative in the 
ALTODIR condition, 100% of the votes from Alito for that value will be conservative).  
We note several features in Figure 13 that may be interesting:  
• First, when Alito’s vote is liberal, there is a high level of agreement amongst the 
justices signified by the relatively tight radius of the outer petals. This indicates 
that Alito typically votes liberally only when most of the Court does so.  
• When Alito’s vote is liberal, we see a decrease in turns following the conservative 
justices and a slight increase in vote disagreement between these justices as 
compared to when Alito’s vote is conservative. This may indicate Alito has a 
tendency to follow-up more often with people who he agrees with.  
• For individual justices, we see some differences in the liberal wing. Though there 
is little change for Ginsburg and Stevens, we see notable changes in the relative 
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frequency when following Breyer (a decrease from the conservative to liberal) 
and Souter (an increase from conservative to liberal).  
• We also note that the relative frequency of follow-ups on Kennedy shows a 
considerable increase from conservative to liberal. Since Alito’s record is more 
moderate than the rest of the conservative wing, this could suggest that Alito has 
more to discuss with the swing justice in particular when their interpretation of a 
case most closely aligned.  
 
 
Figure 13 Alito - Rose Diagrams for the ALTODIR Condition. 
 
Figure 14 contains the charts for Souter in the SOUTDIR condition. As in the 
DIR condition, it will be helpful here to look at things in terms of whether or not the vote 
matches the center justice’s usual ideological direction, and whether other justices are 
from the same wing or the opposing wing (Souter is a liberal justice). 
• Compared to Alito voting against his usual direction, we see a higher level of 
disagreement when Souter is voting against his direction. This indicates Souter’s 
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conservative votes may be less closely related with conservative outcomes from 
the Court.  
• As before, we see a slight increase in the normalized proportion of turns following 
justices from the same wing as the justice in the center when the case is against 
his typical direction (i.e. conservative).  
• We also see a slight increase in the number of turns directed at the opposing wing 
when the outcome is against his usual direction.  
• There is a decrease from conservative to liberal for turns following Ginsburg but 
an increase for turns following Stevens. We also see a fairly large decrease from 
conservative to liberal for Roberts and fairly small increases for Alito and Scalia. 
These variations for individual justices likely suggest much more complex 
relationships between these justices.  
• Finally, we also see a relatively small increase from C to L for Kennedy, 
indicating relatively even amounts of attention given to Kennedy for both 
outcomes. Perhaps this indicates that Souter doesn’t use increased attention as a 




Figure 14 Souter - Rose Diagrams for the SOUTDIR Condition. 
 
Unlike the two examples above, Kennedy’s chart is fairly consistent with respect 
to the normalized proportions for each wing; however, we do still see small but 
potentially interesting differences between the two charts.  
• When Kennedy’s eventual vote is liberal, there is a slightly higher relative 
frequency of turns following liberal justices as compared to when his vote is 
conservative (the converse being true for conservative justices). This suggests that 
Kennedy devotes slightly more attention to whichever wing he is likely to agree 
with.   
• It is also worth noting that for the conservative justices this difference primarily 
comes from a difference in the relative frequency of turns following Roberts, 
while for the liberal justices the difference is primarily distributed across 
Ginsburg, Breyer and Souter, with Stevens showing only a minimal change.  
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Figure 15 Kennedy - Rose Diagrams for the KENDIR Condition. 
 
4.3 Discussion 
The charts and observations above are a sampling of the sorts of general 
conversational patterns that can be observed for individual justices and the Court given 
outcome conditions that are of interest to legal scholars. For example, we saw a tendency 
of some justices from both wings to exhibit similar patterns to their respective opposing 
wings both in DIR and JDIR conditions. This suggests that there are patterns of turn-
taking that can be associated with case outcomes, positively addressing the second point 
of this thesis.  
 Though we have only offered speculative explanations for these patterns, legal 
scholars should find that this sort of analysis could aid in the confirmation or discovery of 
patterns in the interactions of Supreme Court justices. Here we concentrated only on a 
particular subset of justices, outcome variables, and turn-taking patterns. While the 
appendix contains all justices for the conditions discussed above and several more 
outcome variables, there is no reason that these charts need to be limited to these 
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conditions. For example, it may be interesting to compare cases where a justice wrote a 
dissenting opinion compared to cases in which that justice did not. Or, one may wish to 
look at how patterns vary for certain case variables such as the lower court’s direction, or 
combinations of variables such as unanimous conservative decisions. 
The rose diagrams are also a novel application of radial layouts that can be used 
as a new tool for legal researchers when exploring the behavior of the Supreme Court. 
This approach is not limited to this particular pattern (i.e. J1 L J2, where J2 is held 
constant in the chart) of interaction either. There are numerous avenues for future 
research. For example, L could be broken down into petitioner and respondent or 
conservative party and liberal party.18 If we are not particularly concerned with “choice” 
we may want to look at patterns that share a common J1 or simply patterns that share a 
common justice in any position. The primary limiting factor in this sort of analysis is 
ensuring that one has enough cases for a good sampling of patterns. This was the primary 
reason we used a pattern that includes an additional individual between the two justices. 
Shorter patterns that include two justices are fairly rare, and longer patterns are sparser. 
However, with a careful selection of cases and relaxation of conditions one may still find 
that some patterns of this form can be examined as well.  
                                                
18 Where “conservative party” would indicate that a decision in favor of this party is a conservative 
decision, and vice versa for “liberal party”.  
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Chapter 5  Vote Prediction 
 
 
This Section describes our final set of experiments which build upon the insights 
revealed by the rose diagrams in the previous Chapter, examining vote prediction using 
turn sequences. If we can use turn-taking to forecast case outcomes, we will have 
demonstrated the validity of the third main point of this thesis; that the association 
between turn-taking patterns and case outcomes is predictive. Before discussing the 
approach, experiments and results, we will first briefly discuss our findings regarding the 
“most questions asked” method discussed in Chapter 2.  
5.1 Prior approaches 
We will first discuss our attempts to replicate results for the “most questions 
asked” rule discussed by Roberts, Shullman and Wrightsman (Wrightsman 2008), as well 
as Johnson et al. (2009a). While these projects leave the term “question” undefined, two 
reasonable interpretations exist. We could take question literally as any interrogative 
statement, which in the transcripts are usually identified with a question mark at the end. 
This sidesteps some of the issues discussed in Wrightsman, as transcription typically 
includes only one question mark per complete question, with no markings at the end of 
interrupted questions. However, we can also broadly define “question” as all statements 
produced by a justice. Though not the typical interpretation of what a question is, this 
seems to meet the typical treatment of turns produced by justices both as indicated in 
transcripts prior to 2004, which label the majority of Justice turns as “QUESTION”, as 
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well as Wrightsman’s example statements and Johnson’s discussion of “attention given to 
a side”. We explore both here.  
Lacking the training data and some of the features used by Johnson et al. (2009a) 
we will use a simple rule based approach. We simply identify all questions in a case, take 
separate counts for each side and assign a “win” label to whichever side was asked the 
most questions. Following the lead of Johnston et al. (2009a), we can also apply both 
approaches to difference in questions asked and to difference in words directed at each 
side. By using a word based approach we again reduce the concerns about the definition 
of a “question”. However, this does introduce other issues, such as the definition of a 
word (e.g. compounds, counting speech errors, contractions, etc.). To simplify matters, 
we take a word as anything separated by white spaces and word external punctuation 
(where characters such as apostrophe (’) and hyphen (-) are word internal punctuation). 
Table 5 summarizes the results from these experiments.   
 
Approach Accuracy 
Most Questions Asked (by turn) 56.8% 
Most Questions Asked (by ?s) 56.8% 
Most Words Used (by turn) 51.5% 
Most Words Used (by ?s) 53.8% 
Table 5 Comparison of “most attention given” approaches with varying interpretation of “question”. “By 
turn” indicates that we count each turn as a “question”. “By ?s” indicates we counted ?s in the transcribed 
justices’ speech, usually indicating an interrogative statement. 
 
 
As is clear, with this particular set of cases, no benefit is gained from a “most 
attention given” approach. As with most time periods, the majority of cases were 
reversed in this time period, creating a 65.6% most frequent outcome baseline which 
these approaches fail to meet. While interpreting “questions” as interrogatives 
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outperforms a turn based interpretation of questions on a “most words used” approach, no 
difference was found for the “most questions asked” approach. Moreover, the “most 
questions asked” approaches outperformed both “most words used” approaches.  
 Still, one could argue that the continued discrepancy over the power of a “most 
questions asked” rule is a problem of sample size. In the case of the smaller manual 
studies, high accuracy may simply be attributed to a favorable sample selection. For the 
larger study, the distribution of questions compared to case outcome provided by 
Johnston et al. (2009a) is unambiguous, and clearly demonstrates that at least in the 
extreme cases this rule does appear to be valid. Models trained on a larger sample will 
have a more representative distribution of these extreme cases. In fact, like Johnson et al. 
(2009a), if we assign labels based on the “most attention given” rule for extreme cases 
and use the majority class for the rest we do get similar accuracy. Results provided in 
Table 6 are for cases in which the difference in number of questions or words addressed 
to a side is more than 2 standard deviations from the mean.  
 
Approach Cases Accuracy 
Most Questions Asked (by turn) 8 87.5% 
Most Questions Asked (by ?s) 7 75.0% 
Most Words Used (by turn) 6 83.3% 
Most Words Used (by ?s) 6 60.0% 
Table 6 Comparison of “most attention given” rule for extreme cases (i.e. difference in words or questions 
is > 2 s.d. from the mean). The “Cases” column indicates how many cases met this criterion.  
 
 
Because “extreme cases” are simply those that have differences in attention 
(measured by word or turn counts) given to a side more than two standard deviations. It 
may be possible to identify these cases in advance by examining the distribution of prior 
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cases and determining whether or not the difference in attention given for each new case 
is within or outside two standard deviations for the distribution of previous cases.  
5.2 Forecasting votes 
 In our discussion of forecasting oral argument transcripts attention must be given 
to both the sorts of features used and the outcomes that we are forecasting.  We focus on 
using features that are easily extracted automatically, with little to no human input. 
Instead of concentrating on the content of the oral arguments, we concentrate on the 
conversational dynamics of the justices and lawyers involved in a case, as a function of 
their turn-taking behavior. While the content of justices’ and lawyers’ turns is very likely 
informative about a case’s outcome, several factors make it difficult to utilize content 
with automatic methods. First, because the transcripts are composed mostly of 
spontaneous conversation, performance of existing natural language processing 
techniques such as parsing and even POS tagging is considerably lower than in tasks 
where the input is written text or even prepared speeches. Second, while features 
explored in some manual forecasting approaches such as “hostility” and “sympathy” are 
certainly present in the content, these features are also not well defined and not easily 
identified using computational methods. Those features that are somewhat more easily 
identified, such as topic area, vary widely from case to case. This makes it difficult to 
find a relationship between these easily identified features and the cases outcome. 
Finally, as we have shown above, because simple turn based “most questions asked” or 
“most words used” are limited to extreme cases, their recall (in this instance the 
proportion of correct predictions to the number of cases) will be low despite high 
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precision (in this instance, the proportion of correct predictions to the total number of 
predictions).  
 One important consideration when predicting case outcomes is deciding just what 
outcome one wants to predict. The most obvious choice, and the one most often chosen in 
previous prediction tasks, is whether a case will be affirmed or reversed. There are, 
however, other potentially relevant options to choose from. For example, justices are very 
rarely spoken of in terms of their tendency to affirm cases. Typically, when examining 
justice’s voting records, one wants to speak of justices in terms of the direction of their 
ideology; either liberal or conservative. While the vast majority of cases are either 
affirmed or reversed, typically each of these decisions is liberal or conservative as well. If 
the most relevant dimension for discussing justices is the direction of their ideology, then 
it seems fair to at least consider prediction of case outcomes along this dimension as well. 
For these reasons, conservative vs. liberal was the primary outcome feature we 
concentrated on.  
 However, as one would expect, conservative and liberal outcomes do not occur 
with equal probability, and so the baseline for such a condition is not 50%. However, we 
can achieve a 50% baseline by splitting cases and then viewing outcomes as a win or lose 
variable for each side of the case. We explore this outcome in our third experiment.  
5.3 Methods 
Corpus Description 
We use the same corpus as used for the rose charts, described in Section 3.1. 
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Turn Distribution 
As with the sequence prediction task in Chapter 3, from each case we extracted 
speaker IDs and meta-symbols from the transcript. As before, litigants were reduced to a 
single symbol (reported here as L). To conserve space when reporting tables, justices are 
identified by the first four letters of the justice’s last name (Table 7).   From each 
sequence we then counted all turn 4-grams. Since the objective of this experiment is to 
leverage justice interaction as a means for predicting case outcomes, we don’t want the n-
grams to be too short. If the n-grams selected are too small we risk losing information 
about the interaction between justices (as the typical sequence of speakers is Justice, L, 
Justice, L,….). If the n-grams are too long, however, we begin to face sparseness 
problems, since the larger n gets the more variability there is and thus the lower the 
counts will be. Thus 4-grams seemed to be the ideal selection.  
 
Speaker Symbol Count 
Non-justice party L 19840 
Chief Justice Roberts ROBE 3890 
Justice Stevens STEV 1964 
Justice Scalia SCAL 4277 
Justice Kennedy KENN 2196 
Justice Souter SOUT 2590 
Justice Thomas THOM 3 
Justice Ginsburg GINS 2379 
Justice Breyer BREY 2668 
Justice Alito ALIT 840 
Table 7 Speakers and their corresponding symbols. The count column identifies the frequency with which 
each symbol appears in the corpus.  
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There are 41,417 occurrences of 1,072 unique n-grams. Table 8 summarizes the 
20 most frequent 4-grams in the corpus. Because justices do not frequently speak in 
adjacent turns, after each justice’s turn there is typically a lawyer’s turn. Because of this, 
n-grams usually occur in corresponding pairs that have in common a Justice Lawyer 
Justice trigram, but differ in whether the four-gram starts or ends with a lawyer. We, 
therefore, report these pairs together. However, note that they do not always rank next to 
each other, and so the Table is ordered by the rank of the most frequent 4-gram in the 
pair. 
  
Corresponding n-grams Counts Ranks 
L SCAL L SCAL / SCAL L SCAL L 2467 / 2456 1 / 2 
 
L ROBE L ROBE / ROBE L ROBE L 1801 / 1651 3 / 8 
L BREY L BREY / BREY L BREY L 1746 / 1726 4 / 6 
L SOUT L SOUT / SOUT L SOUT L 1729 / 1705 5 / 7 
STEV L STEV L / L STEV L STEV 1237 / 1220 9 / 10 
KENN L KENN L / L KENN L KENN 1182 / 1158 11 / 12 
GINS L GINS L / L GINS L GINS 1137 / 1122 13 / 14 
L SCAL L ROBE / SCAL L ROBE L 418 / 337 15 / 18 
ALIT L ALIT L / L ALIT L ALIT 397 / 387 16 / 17 
L ROBE L SCAL / ROBE L SCAL L 331 / 328 19 / 20 
Table 8 20 most frequent n-grams grouped by correspondence pair, ranked by most frequent n-gram in pair 
 
Note that the majority of these 4-grams include justices “holding-the-floor” with the only 
two instances of more than one justice in the bottom of the table. Despite the fact that the 
most common 4-grams follow this pattern, many less frequent n-grams represent three or 
four instances of a justice speaking (Table 9).   
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n-gram count 
BREY BREY L BREY 18 
SCAL BREY L BREY 18 
SCAL L SCAL SOUT 16 
SCAL L SCAL SCAL 16 
SOUT L SCAL GINS 15 
BREY SCAL BREY SCAL 5 
ROBE SCAL ROBE SCAL 3 
KENN GINS ALIT GINS 1 
Table 9 Infrequent n-grams containing 3-4 instances of justice turns. 
 
 
Note, because the conversational patterns of the Supreme Court are usually very 
consistent, rare patterns like those in Table 9 often indicate uniquely transcribed events; 
the majority of instances where the same justice has two adjacent turns in the transcript 
indicate laughter in the Court. When two justices’ turns are adjacent to one another this 
usually indicates an interruption has occurred. Figure 16 contains examples of both 
laughter and interruptions from the corpus. In the first excerpt, there is laughter after 
Breyer’s first turn, after which he continues to speak.19 Thus the sequence is transcribed 
as BREY BREY L BREY. Also note, Mr. Sorrell’s turn ends with a “--" indicating that 
his turn was unfinished. We interpret this as an interruption. However, because Mr. 
Sorrell is the attorney in this instance, we do not observe anything unusual in the 
sequence for this pair. In the second excerpt the transcript indicates that Roberts was 
interrupted by Scalia, after which Roberts attempts to “hold-the-floor” by interrupting 
Scalia, but eventually gives way to a second interruption by Scalia. This sequence is then 
transcribed as ROBE SCAL ROBE SCAL.  
 
                                                









Before proceeding with any sort of classification, several preprocessing steps 
were taken in some experiments in order to address sparseness issues as well as remove 
irrelevant and potentially distracting features: 
• All non-justice parties are reduced into a single symbol. Since these are most 
often attorneys, we reduced them to the L symbol. This step was taken for all 
experiments. 
• Eliminate all turns not ending with a justice. This essentially reduced the presence 
of feature pairs of the type discussed above.  
• Remove all n-grams containing markup, including TIME, as well as the special 
symbol for the beginning and end of a case. 
Randall v. Sorrell (04-1528) 
JUSTICE BREYER: No, no. It's $200. Coffee and 
donuts are expensive. (Laughter.) 
JUSTICE BREYER: Okay? Count it or not? 
MR. SORRELL: We don't -- our coffee is not 
that expensive, but -- 
JUSTICE BREYER: Donuts and coffee. In other 
words, it counts as long as it's over $100. 
 
Samson v. California (04-9728) 
CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: What about -- 
JUSTICE SCALIA: Is -- 
CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: What about -- 
JUSTICE SCALIA: Is that right? I mean, even in 
prison, I -- what -- I'm not sure you could 
even do that if they were still in prison. Can 




• Collapse all justices into one of three categories; liberal (occupied by Stevens, 
Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer), conservative (occupied by Roberts, Scalia, 
Thomas, and Alito) and swing (occupied by Kennedy).  
While not taken in all experiments, as it seemingly disregards quite a bit of information, 
this final step deserves some more attention. The motivation behind such an approach is 
that it greatly reduces sparseness in the data. Not only is the liberal/conservative ideology 
one that is more or less common knowledge, often observed both in scholarly literature 
and in the media, but it is also clearly indicated in each justice’s voting records. 
Moreover, ideology is often considered one of the more relevant dimensions over which a 
case is decided, so it is extremely relevant to predicting case outcomes. Even when the 
outcome to be predicted is affirm/reverse or agree/disagree, the interaction of the liberal 
justices and conservative justices with the swing justice can be informative in predicting 
case outcomes. However, rather than capturing the interaction between individual 
justices, this is more accurately described as capturing the interaction between wings of 
the Court. Given the rose charts, we may hypothesize that this interaction between the 
wings is also a relevant point to look, as patterns were observed in the way that members 
of each wing treated opposing wings. That is, patterns at the “wing level” should be 
relevant.  
 In addition to these data preparation options, we also calculated feature values in 
two ways. The first, and most straightforward, was to simply use the absolute counts of 
each n-gram. For the second approach we used relative feature scores. For each n-gram 
we divided its frequency by the count of all n-grams for that case. The denominator 
included all n-grams; i.e. even those that were removed from the feature set using the 
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filters described above. While the feature values do not sum to one this means we will be 
able to indirectly encode potentially useful information such as case length.    
Baselines 
 In most studies predicting Supreme Court outcomes, little attention is given to 
baselines. Understandably, at first blush, when trying to predict an outcome like affirm or 
reverse a 50/50 baseline seems applicable. There are only two outcomes in general 
(others are possible, but rare) and both seem to occur with a fair amount of regularity. 
However, when examining the history of the Court, one finds strong tendencies for 
certain outcomes to occur more often than others. Needless to say, the Supreme Court is 
not as simple as a fair coin toss. So, we need to consider the frequency with which each 
outcome occurs in each condition in order to establish more reliable random baseline.  
 For an affirm/reverse condition we look back at the frequency with which the 
Court upheld the lower court’s decision and the frequency with which the lower court 
was overturned. In doing so we find that the Court has a tendency to reverse cases more 
frequently than it affirms cases. Taking a sample of 1000 cases from the 1997 term to the 
2007 term, the Court affirmed cases 34.4% of the time and reversed 65.6% of the time.  
Over shorter periods this tendency can shift drastically; for example, if we look at a 20 
case “moving average” of affirm decision chronologically over this time period (based on 
date of argument) we see that the average reaches as high as 100% and as low as 35%. 
Thus, a random baseline for this example is not 50/50.  
At first this may seem surprising; however, one must consider how cases are 
selected. Of the approximately 9000 cases submitted to the Court each year, only 80 or so 
are selected to be heard by the Court. Naturally, then, the justices are picking those cases 
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which they view as most important, and as it turns out there is a slight bias for those cases 
which the Court will overturn.  
 For a liberal/conservative baseline, the Court is a bit more balanced, at 54.2% 
conservative and 45.8% liberal for the Roberts court (with Alito). This likely has more to 
do with the composition of the Court than anything else. In fact, one might expect to see 
a court with a conservative chief justice and a slightly conservative leaning swing vote 
with a greater proportion of conservatively decided cases.   
 Despite these unbalanced baselines, it is possible to construct experiments that do 
have true 50/50 baselines. The experiment labeled The Court II is an example of this. By 
splitting the case into sides, (i.e. all turns during petitioner’s argument is one side, all 
turns during respondent’s argument is another) and setting the outcome to win/lose we 
ensure that there are an equal number of win instances in the data as there are lose 
instances (as for each case one side must win and the other must lose; again, except in 
rare circumstances).   
5.4 Experiments 
We discuss four experiments in this Section, three dealing with classification of the Court 
as a whole (The Court I, The Court II and The Court III) and one dealing with the 
classification of Thomas’s votes (Thomas).  
The Court I: The first experiment conducted in this category attempted to predict 
whether the Court’s ruling would be liberal or conservative. We found that for this sort of 
task, predicting the outcome of a case for the Court, classification was highly sensitive to 
sparseness, so we collapsed justices into Liberal, Conservative and Swing categories. We 
also employed the filter that reduces the presence of pairs. We use absolute rather than 
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relative feature values. Classification was conducted using the LIBSVM 2.86 
implementation of support vector machines (SVM) with default parameter settings 5-fold 
cross validation and parameter tuning (Cortes and Vapnik 1995).20   
The Court II: As a second experiment we tested the “in favor of side” condition. While 
somewhat more artificial than other experiments, this approach does allow us to examine 
these features in a truly balanced context. We prepared the data by splitting each 
sequence by side, so each case was composed of two sequences; turns produced during 
the petitioner’s arguments and turns produced by the respondent’s arguments. Because 
the Court has a relatively high affirm baseline (meaning the Court usually votes in favor 
of the petitioner) we removed all information about the side that was being spoken to 
from the feature set which are introduced in the form of meta-symbols. By splitting the 
data, we also magnify the sparseness problems from before, and so we continue to 
collapse justices into their ideologies. However, also because of the high level of 
sparseness, we did not remove n-gram pairs, as doing so often reduced the features in any 
given case too far. This experiment used relative rather than absolute feature values. 
Again, note that since in each case one party must win while the other loses, this ensures 
that there are an equal number of winners and losers in the dataset. Again we used the 
LIBSVM implementation of SVMs with default parameter settings and 5-fold cross 
validation with parameter tuning.  
Unlike the liberal/conservative classification, the choice to collapse justices into 
liberal, conservative and swing categories for this condition might at first seem like an 
irrelevant dimension on which to reduce sparseness. However, there are some important 
points to keep in mind. While the Court for this corpus was balanced with liberal and 
                                                
20 http://www.csie.ntu.edu.tw/~cjlin/libsvm/ 
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conservative justices (4 of each), as a result of Thomas’s general silence, the number of 
speakers from each wing is unbalanced. Moreover, looking at the wings rather than 
individual justices, it may be the case that we are able to capture instances of the “three-
way” conversation described by David Frederick’s where the justices are conversing both 
with each other and with a particular lawyer (Biscupic 2006, Johnson et al. 2009a). To 
see why this may matter, consider the rose diagrams discussed in Chapter 4. Although we 
remove identity information of justices by collapsing the data, we are able to maintain the 
general effects that have to do with wings of the Court, and since Kennedy is the only 
swing justice, no identity information is lost for this justice. As a result, we may see cases 
where either Kennedy is showing high levels of agreement with a particular wing, or 
where the wings are jostling for support from Kennedy.21 In either situation, this may be 
an important factor as the swing vote will often be the deciding factor in a case.  
The Court III: In addition to SVM approaches, in these conditions we also attempted 
some rule-based classification conditions. This allows us to identify n-grams that are 
most informative in classification, thus giving us a way to search for those exchanges 
between justices that may be particularly helpful in identifying the outcome of a case. 
This experiment used the WEKA 3.6.0 J48 implementation of decision trees.22 We found 
that our original data preparation options did not perform well with decision trees, 
however, after experimenting with other data preparation options we found that by only 
collapsing justices into their ideology some improvement over baseline was achieved.  
                                                
21 In order to test whether we were simply predicting Kennedy’s votes in this situation we tested 
classification for his votes, for or against a particular side of a case, with the same settings. The classifier 
achieved 58.3% accuracy which suggests this was not the case.  
22 http://www.cs.waikato.ac.nz/ml/weka/ 
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Thomas: Thomas’s voting history indicates a relatively high baseline at 69.5% 
conservative votes. This, of course, is unsurprising given that Thomas is often considered 
one of the most conservative justices currently on the Court. What is surprising is that 
despite this relatively high baseline and his tendency to almost never speak during oral 
arguments, we are able to use the approach described above in order to gain insight as to 
when Thomas will cast one of his relatively rare liberal votes. For the experiments with 
Thomas we found that by not reducing justice IDs to their liberal/conservative 
classifications and by using only those n-grams with more than one justice we did see a 
reasonable improvement in Thomas’s classification accuracy. We used relative rather 
than absolute feature values. Classification was conducted using the WEKA 3.6.0 




Figure 17 Classification results including prior approaches (Court I only), baseline, and absolute accuracy. 
Error bars are the 90% confidence interval as calculated by the Clopper-Pearson method for inferring exact 




The results of the experiments are detailed in Figure 17. Error bars are calculated 
as the 90% confidence interval as computed by the Clopper-Pearson method for inferring 
exact binomial confidence intervals (Clopper & Pearson, 1934). We compare our results 
to prior approaches for The Court I, and the baselines described above for all 
experiments. In all cases, our approach outperforms both prior approaches and the 
baseline. However, as indicated by the error bars, confidence intervals overlap in several 
instances. Both The Court I and The Court II outperform the baseline at a 90% 
confidence level. We also see that The Court I outperforms the “most words used” 
approach on this dataset. This is an important finding because the “most words used” 
approach was found to be the most powerful approach in prior studies (Johnson et al. 
2009a). Moreover, we see that these results are comparable to experiments that used an 
order of magnitude more data (Johnson et al. 2009a). For all experiments on the Court, 
we found that collapsing justices was a very useful preprocessing step. The greatest 
increase in accuracy was provided by SVMs, regardless of the condition. And of the two 
experiments that used SVMs the greatest increase was over the split-case baseline of 
50%. While decision trees do not provide the double digit increases that SVMs do, they 
still provide some improvement over baseline with the added benefit of providing 
decision trees that can be examined. The results for Thomas are perhaps the most 
surprising. Though the improvement is relatively small, not only are we dealing with a 
much higher baseline, but this suggests that the interaction of the justices who do talk 
during cases is correlated with the way Thomas will vote even though he rarely 
participates in oral arguments.  
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Because the decision tables are easily interpretable, we can also examine the 
specific n-grams that are most informative in classification. We are especially interested 
in n-grams that contain more than one justice, because these best highlight the 
interactions between individual justices. Decision tables returned four such 4-grams that 
contained more than one justice. Figure 18 contains these sequences along with examples 
of these sequences from the corpus. 
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Figure 18 Informative sequences from Thomas decision trees with examples from transcripts. 
BREY BREY L GINS 
Ex. From Michael A. Watson v. United States (06-571) 
JUSTICE BREYER: I don't want to put you in a whipsaw here. 
(Laughter.)  
JUSTICE BREYER: Sometimes policy seems relevant, too, to figure out 
what Congress wanted. But let me go back to the question I had, 
which is do you want to us overturn Smith?, Are you asking that, 
because I could understand it more easily if you said, look, both 
sides of the transaction should be treated alike, but they should be 
both outside the word "use."  
MR. KOCH: I do not believe it's necessary for this Court to overrule 
Smith in order to rule for the Petitioner here, because of -- 
because of the differences, first of all linguistically; and 
secondly because of the reliance on Bailey.  
JUSTICE GINSBURG: And in answer to my question, you said you were 
not urging the overruling of Smith?  
 
SOUT SCAL L SCAL  
Ex. From Federal Election Comm'n v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc. 
(06-969) 
JUSTICE SOUTER: And it is impossible to know what the words mean 
without knowing the context in which they are spoken.  
JUSTICE SCALIA: When the Government put these exhibits, were those 
exhibits complete with context?  
MR. BOPP: No. There was no --  
JUSTICE SCALIA: I didn't think so. They just -- they just -- what 
the ads were.  
 
SCAL L SCAL GINS 
Ex. From Engquist v. Oregon Dept. of Agriculture (07-474) 
JUSTICE SCALIA: That's certainly an equal protection. She could be 
fired at will and everybody else can be fired at will.  
MS. METCALF: Agreed.  
JUSTICE SCALIA: Why isn't that equal protection of the law?  
JUSTICE GINSBURG: Except this wasn't -- this wasn't employment at 
will, right?  
 
BREY ROBE L GINS 
Ex. From Travelers Casualty & Surety Co. of America v. Pacific Gas & 
Elec. Co. (05-1429) 
JUSTICE BREYER: And, and yet there are no briefs from them; there 
are no -- there is no article that I could find in Bankruptcy 
Journal.  
CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Well, there may be no briefs from them 
because it isn't the question on which we granted cert, is it?  
MR. BRUNSTAD: Chief Justice Roberts, that's Official correct. And 
our view is that the Court should deal only with the Fobian rule. 
And the alternative argument which Respondent presents was never 
argued below, was not decided below, was not presented in the 
opposition to certiorari. It's been rejected by every single court 
of appeals --  
JUSTICE GINSBURG: But it would be proper to remand for the Ninth 









Since the baselines for individual justices are so high, any improvement in 
classification accuracy is going to come from the ability to predict unusual behavior from 
that justice. This is just what we found in the case of Thomas. One can already predict the 
majority of Thomas’s votes simply by assuming his vote will be conservative. In order to 
move beyond this simple baseline, one needs to be able to predict liberal cases. By 
predicting these with high precision, we are able to boost performance when predicting 
outcomes for Thomas. Though such results may be subject to the danger of over-fitting, 
as additional cases are being created, it will be possible to test this approach further. Of 
course, as justices change so too will the performance this approach.  
Discussion 
These classification experiments built upon the observations in Chapter 4 that 
turn-sequences are associated with case outcomes. These results indicate that there are 
patterns in justices’ turn-taking behavior that are in fact predictive of case outcomes. 
Additionally, we show improvement on our dataset over approaches previously shown to 
have the best performance the most comprehensive prior study. Moreover, the accuracy is 
comparable to that of studies that used an order of magnitude more data than our study, 
while exploring a novel hypothesis about the predictability of Supreme Court outcomes 
and the features of the case that are used make predictions (Johnson et al. 2009a).  
The fact that any benefit at all is achieved using interaction features as simple as 
turn-taking is a novel finding that may surprise some researchers (Evans, M. personal 
correspondence, August 28, 2009). Questions still remain as to why the features used are 
important. Without a doubt the content of justices’ turns are informative with regard to a 
case’s outcome, but what about the conversational nature of the exchanges represented by 
 75 
our features? Future research might ask what characteristics of these exchanges are 
informative. Perhaps it is general features, such as the tone of the exchange, or perhaps 
these n-grams isolate strategic exchanges where judges in opposition to one another are 
looking to counter other justices’ arguments and judges in agreement to one another are 
providing support.   
Interestingly, this approach has the potential to predict both the behavior of the 
Court as well as individual justices. This is an important finding as it suggests that these 
approaches may not need to be restricted to natural courts.  
This work represents a methodologically novel approach, thus creating a new tool 
for researchers looking to gain a greater understanding of the Supreme Court and the 
justices. As discussed below, as more data is created (thus reducing sparseness) numerous 
extensions to this approach present themselves, suggesting the possibility of richer more 
powerful models of justice interaction and court behavior. 
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Chapter 6  Conclusions 
 
This work represents the first steps towards modeling the relationship between 
Supreme Court justices’ interactions and actions. We have novelly applied computational 
methods for pattern discovery in Supreme Court discourse which may more generally be 
applied in legal discourse. While legal scholars and other court followers may have 
intuitions about the social dynamics of the Court, these intuitions are most often limited 
to a few areas of expertise and a narrow range of examples. What this work offers is a 
global approach to pattern discovery in the social dynamics of the Supreme Court 
justices. With these patterns, legal scholars are given a new avenue for research that can 
lead to a greater understanding of this country’s highest court that would otherwise go 
unexplored.  
This work addressed three objectives: to show that a) predictable high level 
patterns exist in the conversational dynamics of the Supreme Court,  b) these patterns 
may be associated with other areas of interest to legal scholars such as voting patterns of 
the justices,  c) this association between linguistic patterns and judicial patterns may be 
utilized both to provide short term insights (i.e. predicting the outcome of a particular 
case) and deeper insights about the behavior of the Supreme Court.  Our results indicate 
that a, b and c do hold. We have found that by combining features with regard to turn 
content, discourse marker use, and personal reference we can gain information about who 
is speaking when and that by increasing the history of these features we can further boost 
the reliability of these methods. The rose charts demonstrate that interesting patterns can 
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be observed when we are looking at summaries of the turn-taking behavior for various 
conditions. Our prediction approach performed significantly better than prior approaches 
on the same data and comparably to approaches utilizing an order of magnitude more 
data (Johnson et al. 2009a). These results indicate that turn-taking patterns are in fact 
predictive of case outcomes.   
In addition to the contribution of positive results, we have also made a number of 
methodological contributions as well. While the analysis of Supreme Court discourse is 
not new, our approach of viewing the patterns of Supreme Court turn-taking as both 
predictable and predictive of case outcomes is a novel one, and we have offered several 
techniques to explore this hypothesis. We addressed only a narrow range of questions 
with these techniques, but expect that legal scholars will find a wide array of hypotheses 
to explore. Additionally, our rose diagrams are a new application of radial plots that are 
helpful in visualizing the relationship between turn-taking sequences and actions (Draper 
2009).  
6.1 Future work and Unanswered Questions 
 Unfortunately, sparseness is a major limiting factor in combining content with 
turn sequences for the Supreme Court. However, as data is continually being created, 
these problems should be continually reduced. Moreover, though not explicitly identified 
in the transcripts prior to 2004, the identity of individual justices is not lost, as the audio 
transcripts of these cases still exist. Perhaps by combining audio speaker recognition 
techniques with our justice identification approach, one could reconstruct speaker 
identities for these earlier cases (Yuan and Liberman 2008). Doing so would provide 
considerably more data for experimentation. If sparseness issues are appropriately 
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addressed one could incrementally increase the amount of information used in turn 
sequences. For example, with limited additional work, one could include further turn 
features such as interruptions, perceived humor (indicated in transcripts with a “laughter” 
marker), and question vs. statement. As indicated above in Section 5.3, while not overtly 
marked, these first two features still managed to find their way into our dataset as 
discussed above and were some of the most informative features in classifying Thomas. 
While overtly marking these features increases sparseness too far, adding more data 
reduces this problem making the overt marking of these features viable; and given the 
results above one would expect them to be helpful. As other researchers have found, the 
questioning pattern is likely indicative of case outcomes, at least in extreme cases. Thus, 
one might expect some benefit from incorporating questioning features in the turn 
sequence. 
Moreover, in many cases the existence of interruptions and laughter is indicative 
of higher level features of a turn, such as hostility and tone of questioning. Though the 
reliability of identification of these features is currently untested, work in areas such as 
sentiment detection may be useful in attempting to identify these features (Pang and Lee 
2008). If successful, these too could be included in the turn sequence and would likely 
give further insight into the interaction of the justices.  
Another strong cue to the interaction of justices would be the discourse relations 
that hold between justices’ turns. Again, while incorporating features for discourse 
relations in the turn sequence would inherently increase sparseness, if and when 
sparseness is addressed, including discourse markers in the turn sequence is a logical first 
step to creating a richer feature set that includes information about discourse relations. 
 79 
Ultimately, one would ideally want to identify the underlying relations that hold between 
the turns in the sequence. Identifying the speaker or wing of the speaker along with how 
the turn relates to the previous turn would clearly provide rich information about the 
interaction of justices and would likely be highly informative regarding case outcomes.  
 Though sentiment analysis would likely make considerable contributions to the 
quality of Supreme Court forecasting as suggested by Wrightsman (2008) and Johnson et 
al. (2009a) automatic detection of sentiment in a domain such as Supreme Court 
discourse is likely to be considerably harder than the already difficult typical sentiment 
analysis tasks. While overt sentiment may be expressed by word choice, in a formal 
setting such as the Supreme Court, sentiment will often not be expressed overtly, thus 
requiring researchers to rely on methods for identifying covert sentiment (Evans et al. 
2007, Green and Resnik 2009). This raises its own issues, as expression of covert 
sentiment is likely to vary between cases as the issue area of cases changes. These factors 
make the task of automatic sentiment detection in this domain a considerably different 
task than typical areas of sentiment detection such as movie and product reviews. 
 In Chapter 1 we discussed the potential broader implications of this research. That 
is, this work could be extended to other situations where we are interested in the 
relationship between conversational behavior and non-linguistic actions. While we are 
confident that we could directly apply these approaches to other similar situations, e.g. 
lower courts or even contestant judging on reality shows, this opens up the question of 
just how far approaches similar to those covered here can be applied. Do individuals in 
conversational settings take on recognizable natural roles (e.g. leader, “devil’s advocate”, 
etc.) that are applicable across numerous situations? If so, would we be able to reduce 
 80 
reliance on speaker and domain specific training data, expanding the applicability of 
these approaches to a wider range of conversational settings such as business negotiations 
and other meetings? And, what might we learn about human interaction in general and 
the relationship between conversational interaction and real world actions from these 
sorts of approaches? By exploring the conversational dynamics of the U.S. Supreme 
Court and their relationship with the actions taken by the Court as a whole and by 
individual justices, this work begins to address these questions. 
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Appendix B Discourse Markers 
 












after this  
afterwards 
again 
again and again 
albeit 
all in all 
all right 
all the same 

























as a corollary 
as a hypothetical 
as a logical 
conclusion 
as a matter of 
fact 
as a result 
as a whole 
as against 
as an 
as briefly as 
as closely as 
as evidence 
as far as 
as for 
as i said 
as i say 
as i understand 
as if 
as it happened 
as it is 
as it turned out 
as long as 
as luck would 
have it 




as we shall 




at a time 
at any rate 
at first 
at first sight 





at some level 
at some point 
at that 
at that moment 
at that point 
at that time 
at the moment 
at the moment 
when 
at the outset 
at the same time 
at the time 
at this date 
at this moment 
at this point 
at this stage 
at which  
at which point 
back 
















but then again 
by 
by all means 
by and by 
by and large 
by comparison 
by contrast 
by that time 
by the same 
by the same 
token 
by the time 

































































for a start 
for example 




for that matter 
for that reason 
for the reason 
that 
for the simple 
reason 
for this 
for this reason 






from now on 





































if such a 
in a different 
vain 
in a sense 
in actual fact 
in addition 
in all candor 
in all due 
respect 
in any case 







in doing so 






in just the same 
way 
in may be 
concluded that 
in my case 
in my opinion 
in my view 
in one instance 
in order to 
in other respects 
in other words 
in our judgment 
in our view 
in part 
in particular 
in place of 
in point of fact 
in practice 





in so doing 
in so many 
words 
in spite of 
in spite of that 
in such a 
in such an 
in sum 
in that 
in that case 
in that instance 
in that respect 
in that scenario 
in that statement 
in the beginning 
in the case of 
in the end 
in the event 
in the first place 
in the hope that 
in the meantime 
in the same way 
in theory 
in this case 
in this 
connection 
in this respect 




in which case 
in your opinion 





















it can be 
concluded that 
it follows 
it follows that 
it happens 
it is because 
it is clear 
it is conceivable 
it is conclusive 
it is correct 
it is for this 
reason 







it turns out 
just 














let us assume 











































































on a  different 
note 






on its face 
on its own 
on one hand 
on one side 
on that 
on that point 
on that question 
on that very 
point 
on the bases 
on the basis 
on the contrary 
on the face of 
on the grounds 
on the grounds 
that 
on the one hand 
on the other 
on the other 
hand 
on the other side 
on this basis 
on this 
particular issue 
on top of it 
on top of that 



































































































that is all 
that is how 
that is to say 
that is why 




the fact is 
the fact is that 
the first time 
the instant 
the issue here 
the key 
the key words 
the last time 
the latter 
the logic is that 
the moment 
the more 
the more often 
the next time 
the one time 
the point 
the point being 
the point is 
the question 
the question is 
























to be clear 
to be fair to 
them 
to be precise 
to be sure 







to get back 
to go on 
to go to 
to illustrate 
to interrupt 







to put it 
to put it in 
context 
to put it this way 
to repeat 
to start with 
to stop 
to sum up 
to summarize 
to take an 
example 
to the best of my 
knowledge 
to the best of 
our knowledge 
to the degree 
that 
to the extent  
to the extent 
possible 
to the extent that 






























up to now 







we might say 
we think not 
we think that 
well 
what i mean to 
say 










whether or not 
which 











with all due 
respect 
with all respect 
with one 
addition 
with regard to 
with respect 
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